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Abstract 
Based on a system of innovation (SI) perspective, this paper provides a dynamic analysis of 
innovation and industrial development in the emerging global solar energy sector. It focus-
es on developments in China and Germany within the context of an evolving international 
technological innovation system (TIS) for solar photovoltaics. The TIS approach is the most 
suitable for analyzing innovation systems in emergent technology fields, as it explicitly 
captures the dynamics of change in the system (Jacobsson & Bergek 2011). However, to 
date, the approach has been applied to analyze national TIS, largely ignoring international 
influences (Coenen et al. 2012).   
To fill this gap in the literature, the paper adapts and applies the TIS framework for the 
analysis of a co-evolving TIS. This is different from a purely international perspective, as 
manifested in the sectoral system of innovation (SSI) approach. The SSI approach may be 
appropriate for the analysis of more established innovation systems, where structures, ac-
tors and institutions are more stable (Coenen & Díaz López 2010). An emergent global TIS, 
however, remains highly susceptible to (policy) developments occurring in individual coun-
tries. To capture these dynamics, the concept of a multi-level TIS is proposed. This 
acknowledges that a global TIS is composed of a number of sub-systems (i.e. TIS) at the 
national and sub-national levels, which retain a certain degree of autonomy. At the same 
time, actors and networks are frequently not limited to a single geographic scale, as has 
been acknowledged in relational approaches to economic geography (Bathelt & Gluckler 
2003; Yeung 2005). They may entertain linkages across multiple scales, often drawing on a 
physical presence in different localities. Such linkages allow developments in national (or 
sub-national) TIS to exert influences upon each other.  
The paper draws on this adapted version of the TIS concept to frame the empirical analysis 
of an evolving global TIS in solar photovoltaics. Building on a slightly expanded version of 
the system functions outlined by Bergek et al. (2008), the paper then traces the dynamic 
inter-linkages between Germany and China, as they have represented the most important 
drivers of change during the most dynamic period of TIS development. It sheds new light 
on the process of industry development and technological change in the emergent TIS for 
solar photovoltaics and highlights how different system functions have been provided 
throughout this process (considering third countries where appropriate) and how they have 
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This paper provides a dynamic analysis of innovation and industrial development in the 
emerging global solar energy sector. It focuses on the development of crystalline silicon-
based photovoltaic (PV) technologies in the period from 2004 to 2010. It describes how pol-
icy, market and industry dynamics in Germany and China have co-evolved and reinforced 
each other, thus enabling the dynamic market growth and industry expansion witnessed 
during the period.  
To do so, the paper builds on and adapts the technological innovation system (TIS) frame-
work and the related system functions approach (Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, & 
Rickne, 2008; Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Kuhlmann, & Smits, 2007). It is argued that the exist-
ing TIS framework may be suitable for understanding early stages in the development of a 
national TIS. However, it does not sufficiently account for the inter-linkages between dif-
ferent TIS, which gain in importance as the TIS matures and which have played a key role 
in driving the dynamic growth of the PV sector over the past decade. The study, therefore, 
proposes an expanded TIS framework for analyzing the dynamics of co-evolution between 
multiple country-level TIS. This allows the framework to capture the key role played by 
the dynamically increasing inter-linkages and feedbacks between initially largely separate 
TIS. Given the crucial importance of national policy in the development of the TIS for PV-
based solar energy, it is argued that the proposed framework remains the most appropriate 
approach to understanding development in this policy-driven sector for the time being. 
Other approaches, such as the sectoral system of innovation (Malerba, 2006) or the global 
value chain approach (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2011), which provide a truly international 
perspective on innovation and industrial development, do not sufficiently account for rele-
vant country-specific dynamics.  
As indicated, the analysis focuses on Germany and China, the key drivers of TIS develop-
ment during the period under consideration. Where appropriate, key influences from third 
countries, such as the US, Australia, Japan, Spain and Italy, are also mentioned. However, 
in an effort to limit the scope of the paper, no detailed account of developments in these 
countries is provided. A truly comprehensive analysis of the emergent global TIS for solar 
PV would also require an in-depth treatment of these third countries. Nevertheless, the 
chosen approach highlights not only the most important empirical phenomena, but it is al-
so able to conceptually capture most if not all the relevant processes driving the emer-
gence of a global TIS.  
2 Theoretical Discussion and Analytical Framework 
2.1 Theoretical discussion 
In the innovation system literature, the TIS framework and the related system functions 
approach proposed by Bergek et al. (2008) has emerged as the most suitable for analyzing 
the dynamics of innovation in emergent technology fields (Coenen, Benneworth, & Truffer, 
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2012; Coenen & Díaz López, 2010). One of the key distinguishing features of the system 
function approach is its ability to capture the dynamic evolution of an innovation system. 
Among other things, it has been applied to analyze the development of renewable energy 
technologies in Germany (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004).  
According to Bergek et al. (2008), a TIS refers to “a socio-technical system focused on the 
development, diffusion and use of a particular technology” (p.408) (emphasis added by the 
author). This may be distinguished from other system of innovation approaches, which fo-
cus on innovation in a particular sector (Malerba, 2006), country (Nelson, 1993) or region 
(Asheim & Gertler, 2006). Based on this technology-based delineation of the innovation 
system, Bergek et al (2008) have developed an analytical approach, which defines seven 
key processes, or “functions,” with a “direct and immediate impact” (p.409) on the dy-
namics of TIS development (i.e. the development, diffusion and use of a chosen technolo-
gy). These seven “system functions” are considered the most important drivers of devel-
opment and change in the TIS and serve as a heuristic device for analyzing the dynamics of 
TIS development. Each system function represents a synthesis of theoretical concepts and 
key findings from the innovation system literature as well as work from related fields, in-
cluding political science, sociology, and organization theory (a short summary of each of 
the seven system functions is provided in the box on the following page).Finally, the func-
tions are interlinked and may be mutually reinforcing. Hence, positive feedback loops 
within the TIS may set in motion a process of “cumulative causation” (Jacobsson and Ber-
gek, 2004, p. 823), thus enabling a period of particularly dynamic development of the TIS.  
The system functions approach has been applied in a long list of empirical case studies, 
mainly on emergent TIS at the national and regional level. These studies have shown that 
it provides a useful analytical framework for analyzing TIS development in early stages of 
system formation, when the relevant dynamics are largely (if not entirely) confined to na-
tional boundaries. However, in more advanced stages of system formation, inter-linkages 
with TIS in other countries gain in importance. In this context, it no longer suffices to ana-
lyze the TIS in an individual country, but it becomes necessary to understand the dynamic 
interaction between multiple TIS. Although, in principle, a TIS spans geographic boundaries 
(Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Hekkert et al., 2007), in the past most studies have not 
considered cross-country interactions or other international influences in their treatment 
of a country-specific TIS (Coenen et al., 2012). Multi-country studies have largely taken a 
comparative approach without exploring the dynamic inter-linkages across countries. The 
few studies with a truly international focus on the other hand have largely abstracted from 
the national-level and have focused attention on the activities of key firms within an in-
ternational context (see for example Köhler et al., 2012).1  
                                            
 
1
 The resulting studies have important similarities with the sectoral innovation system approach. 
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Box: The seven system functions (Bergek et al. 2008) 
Knowledge development and diffusion refers to the evolution of the knowledge base underlying 
the TIS, how this knowledge is transferred to new actors and how it is utilized for promoting in-
novation and technological change. 
Influence on the direction of search refers to pressures and incentives to invest in the develop-
ment of particular technologies and which provide guidance for actors engaged in technology de-
velopment and innovation within the TIS.  
Entrepreneurial experimentation refers to risk-taking by individuals and firms resulting in cer-
tain types of entrepreneurial ventures and the development of experiments, which support TIS 
development by enabling a social learning process and addressing unmet needs within the TIS. 
Market formation refers to the evolving customer demand for the related technology, both in 
terms of its size and the specific requirements requested by the developing customer base. 
Legitimation refers to the process of building legitimacy for a given technology among stakehold-
ers who have the ability to support or constrain the development of the TIS as well as the broader 
public in so far as it represents an influencing factor for TIS development.  
Resource mobilization refers to the process of mobilizing different types of resources, which are 
important for the development of the TIS, most importantly financial and human resources. 
Development of positive externalities refers to the development of external economies result-
ing from system development and which enhance the ability of actors in the system to support 
the remaining system functions by lowering barriers of entry, providing easier access to needed 
resources or inputs, reducing uncertainty, etc.  
This paper argues that a pure international focus may be an appropriate approach in cer-
tain well established technology fields, where national-level dynamics have lost considera-
bly in importance. However, in more advanced yet still formative stages of a global TIS, 
national-level systems retain a considerable degree of autonomy. This is particularly true 
in markets for environmental technologies, where market formation is heavily dependent 
on national-level policy choices rather than broader market trends (Jänicke & Lindemann, 
2010). Simultaneously, it has been shown that the diffusion of environmental policies may 
lead to the development of similar, policy-driven markets as the related technology gains 
in maturity (Jänicke & Jacob, 2004). In tandem with the emergence of an increasing num-
ber of country-level TIS, cross-country linkages gain in importance, leading to dynamic in-
teractions and feedbacks between different innovation systems.  
Bergek and Jacobsson (2003) acknowledge the importance of considering different phases 
of industry evolution when analyzing the functional dynamics of a TIS. They identify two 
key phases and point out the different roles played by various functions in this context. 
The first phase is characterized by experimentation with frequent entries and exits of 
firms and a relatively large variety of competing technological alternatives. This is fol-
lowed by a growth phase, in which firm entries as well as technological variety are re-
duced, industry consolidation takes place and diffusion and firm expansion take center 
stage. The proposed framework addresses the latter of the two phases of TIS development, 
highlighting the importance of cross-country linkages during this phase. In fact, it is argued 
that developments in this growth phase cannot be understood without an analysis of the 
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increasing transnational linkages in the system and the resulting process of value chain 
segmentation, which accompanies this second phase of industry evolution.  
The lack of such a spatial perspective has been identified as an important weakness in the 
current TIS literature (Coenen et al., 2012). In their spatial critique of the TIS framework, 
Coenen et al., (2012) point out the need to consider different geographical contexts and 
scales when analyzing the structures and dynamics of a particular TIS. To fill this gap in 
the literature, a number of studies have emerged, which have focused particular attention 
on the transnational linkages within emerging TIS. Using social network analysis as a tool, 
Binz, Truffer, & Coenen, (2013) have demonstrated not only that transnational linkages are 
relevant at different stages of TIS development. They have also shown that the spatial con-
figuration as manifested in the network of national and transnational linkages change quite 
rapidly as the TIS evolves. In addition studies have emerged, which analyze the role of 
transnational linkages in the development of a particular country-level TIS (Binz, Truffer, 
Li, Shi, & Lu, 2012). The proposed study goes a step further by providing a dynamic analy-
sis of a global TIS, albeit through the lens of two key countries (i.e. China and Germany). It 
highlights the importance of transnational interactions and mutually reinforcing feedbacks 
between China and Germany as key drivers of global TIS development. 
In doing so, it also goes beyond the broader literature on the international dimensions of 
industrial development and technological change. Past studies in this area have primarily 
focused on the firm level, i.e. the international investment behavior of primarily multina-
tional firms. Vernon’s product lifecycle hypothesis, which focused primarily on the behav-
ior of US-based firms, represented the first attempt to link the dynamics of industrial inno-
vation and product lifecycles to concurrent changes in the location of production. He hy-
pothesized in the 1960s that US firms were pioneers in the development of innovations, 
which were labor-saving and which responded to the “high-income wants” of US custom-
ers. Moreover, as products gained maturity and developed into global products, these firms 
were likely to shift production centers to low-cost locations (Vernon, 1966). By the late-
1970s, he had revised his hypothesis in light of the increasingly global outlook of (multina-
tional) firms. He acknowledged that firms with a global production network may not only 
shift production to low-cost locations earlier in the product lifecycle, but they might also 
develop innovations tailored to the particular needs of other countries than the US. Never-
theless, his premise that innovations were likely to be initially produced in a high-income 
target market before production was shifted to a lower cost location remained intact 
(Vernon, 1979).  
The product lifecycle hypothesis has since been broadened to cover multinational firms 
more generally and adapted to account for the increasingly global nature of production 
networks. Based on Vernon’s hypothesis, the concept of a “lead market” has been devel-
oped to identify markets for the development and introduction of particular innovation de-
signs (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990; Beise, 2004; Meyer-Krahmer & Reger, 1999). Initially, the 
related literature remained focused on firm-level behavior. The country-specific charac-
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teristics of these lead markets were used to explain the decisions of multinationals regard-
ing the location of R&D facilities.  
Beise (2004) took this discussion a step further by abstracting from the firm-level and de-
veloping a set of country-level factors – or “lead market advantages” -  for understanding 
the international success (i.e. diffusion) of certain technological innovations. The underly-
ing assumption has remained, however, that innovations emerge in certain (industrialized) 
countries, which is followed by their international diffusion. The approach assumes that 
innovations emerge and establish themselves first in a particular lead market without sig-
nificant interaction occurring with other markets. It contends that national or regional 
markets bring forth competing innovation designs before one of the country-specific de-
signs establishes itself as a globally dominant design. In other words, the framework 
acknowledges competition but not the dynamic inter-linkages and feedbacks between 
country-level innovation systems.  
The following case study on solar energy will demonstrate that this linear model of innova-
tion (step 1) followed by diffusion (step 2) does not do justice to the dynamic process of 
internationalization during the growth phase of this emergent TIS. Rather the picture that 
emerges is one of increasingly interlinked and mutually supportive TIS. Although the role of 
a lead market remains relevant for stimulating the transition from the formative to the 
growth phase, the subsequent international dynamics of TIS development are decidedly 
more complex than assumed by Beise and other scholars in the field. The diffusion of the 
particular innovation, i.e. the gradual formation of an international market, may not pro-
gress in tandem with the spatial reconfiguration of industry. Instead, demand- and supply 
side dynamics diverge to a considerable degree, and TIS development is characterized by a 
dynamic process of co-evolution in which different countries fulfill different and evolving 
functions within an emerging global TIS. Moreover, as this study of the solar PV sector in 
Germany and China will demonstrate, emerging economies are not primarily recipients or 
mere adapters of foreign technology as the discourse of catching-up or latecomer industri-
alization might suggest (Fu, Pietrobelli, & Soete, 2011; Watson, Sauter, & Centre, 2011). 
Rather the study suggests that China has in fact played a key role in driving overall TIS de-
velopment.  
2.2 A co-evolutionary framework for TIS development 
To capture these dynamics, the concept of a global multi-level TIS is proposed. This 
acknowledges that a global TIS is composed of a number of sub-systems at the national and 
sub-national levels, which retain a certain degree of autonomy. In fact, in an emergent 
and policy-driven TIS, institutional changes at the national-level have important impact on 
TIS development. As acknowledged in relational approaches to economic geography 
(Bathelt & Gluckler, 2003; Yeung, 2005), however, actors and networks are frequently not 
limited to a single geographic scale. They may entertain linkages across multiple scales, 
often drawing on a physical presence in different localities. Such linkages represent the in-
ter-connections between different sub-systems within a multi-level TIS and allow develop-
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ments in national (or sub-national) TIS to exert influences upon each other. They play an 
important role in the development of a global TIS, increasing in strength, number and 
complexity during the growth phase of a TIS.  
In other words, the multi-level TIS concept rests on the following conceptual adaptations 
or clarifications of the TIS concept. It rejects the idea that an emergent, global TIS can be 
described independently from country-specific framework conditions and dynamics. At the 
same time, it challenges the idea that TIS dynamics during the growth phase of an industry 
can be adequately considered at the level of a single country. Rather it is essential to con-
sider developments in multiple countries and how these co-evolve.  
To do so, it is necessary to focus attention on the linkages that enable such cross-country 
interactions. It does not suffice to acknowledge the existence of cross-national networks, 
but it requires an acknowledgment of how these networks are configured and how interac-
tions within these networks influence overall TIS development. The paper offers a basic 
analytical framework further outlined below for describing the most important linkages be-
tween Germany and China as well as other key countries. In addition, it highlights the fact 
that as transnational linkages increase, dynamic feedbacks across countries also grown in 
importance. Due to the continuing importance of policy, domestic actors and institutions 
retain significant influence on national TIS development. However, increasingly the inter-
ventions by domestic actors are also shaped by important developments abroad.  
Finally, the paper introduces a conceptual adaptation to the seven system functions, as 
they have been proposed by Bergek et al. (2008). It proposes an eighth system function, 
which is labeled as “development of scale economies and cost reduction”. This function 
highlights the crucial role that cost reduction plays in enabling the diffusion of a technolo-
gy and hence the growth of the related TIS. Cost reduction may result both from core 
technological advances, process innovations as well as the increasing scale of production. 
Arguably, this function is partly overlapping with other system functions, like the devel-
opment of positive externalities, knowledge development or resource mobilization. The 
author, however, takes the position that overlaps and inter-dependencies across system 
functions are in fact inherent to the framework. Notably, the development of external 
economies is both supported by the remaining functions and reinforces them.  
In other words, the system functions do not represent mutually exclusive analytical cate-
gories derived from a consistent theoretical basis. Rather, as indicated above, they func-
tion as a heuristic device for better understanding TIS dynamics. In this context, it is con-
sidered legitimate and useful to add this important system function. As the following anal-
ysis of the TIS for solar photovoltaics demonstrates, the changing geographical pattern in 
the development of scale economies and cost-reduction plays a key role in understanding 
the overall dynamics of TIS development.  
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2.3 Scheme of analysis and structure of the paper 
In the remainder of the paper, these new and adapted concepts are applied to frame the 
empirical analysis of an evolving global TIS in solar photovoltaics. In doing so, it focuses on 
developments in Germany and China from 2004 to 2010, as these countries have repre-
sented the most important drivers of change during the most dynamic period of TIS devel-
opment. Germany has represented the lead market for solar photovoltaics during this dy-
namic growth phase, accounting for more than 50 percent of the worlds installed capacity 
until 2010. Moreover, it remains the most important producer of production equipment, 
inverters and a number of components. China, on the other hand, has risen to the largest 
supplier of solar photovoltaic cells and modules, having captured more than 50 percent of 
these markets. 
The paper begins with a review of system functions at the national level in both Germany 
and China in the period between 1999 and 2003. Building on this introductory section, the 
main part of the empirical analysis traces the changing functional dynamics of the TIS in 
Germany and China during the period of 2004 to 2010. It shows how these dynamics have 
affected overall TIS development as well as the important geographical shift of the main 
production center to China. The analysis will first treat developments in Germany and Chi-
na independently, alluding to foreign drivers of system functions where necessary. Follow-
ing this, an overview and systematization of the most important transnational linkages is 
provided. The paper closes with a description of the key feedbacks and inter-dependencies 
between the TIS development in Germany and China, enabled by these linkages and which 
have shaped developments in the two countries as well as the global TIS.  
In this way, the paper is able to trace how a process of co-evolution involving these two 
countries has shaped the growth and geographic reconfiguration of a global, multi-level TIS 
in solar photovoltaics. Ideally, the analysis would also include an in-depth treatment of 
other key countries, which have played an important role in TIS development, such as Ita-
ly, Spain, the US, Taiwan and Japan. Since this is beyond the scope of the paper, it focuses 
on Germany and China, considering important developments in third countries where ap-
propriate. Although this cannot do justice to the full complexity of global TIS develop-
ment, it provides a sufficient empirical basis for understanding the core dynamics of 
growth and internalization in the TIS for solar photovoltaics, while sketching out a frame-
work for analyzing the suggested co-evolutionary dynamics of change.  
3 Setting the scene: functional dynamics of the TIS for solar photovol-
taic technology in China and Germany from 1999 to 2003 
The following section provides a snapshot of the Germany’s and China’s TIS for solar PV in 
2003. It outlines the most important developments within the eight system functions, 
while introducing key actors, networks and institutions.  




The legitimation of renewable energies in general took an important boost with the emer-
gence of the first federal government with participation from the Green Party in 1998 
(Fuchs & Wassermann, 2012). These favorable political conditions represented an im-
portant backdrop against which the solar energy sector was able to take important positive 
developments during the period. During its first term, the government took the decision to 
phase-out nuclear energy, while reducing the country’s CO2 emissions, so that ambitious 
renewable energy targets became inevitable (Mautz & Byzio, 2005). By 2010, the govern-
ment wanted to achieve a share of at least 12,5 percent electricity from renewable 
sources (Government of Germany, 2002, p. 97). A further boost came with the transfer of 
the renewable energy portfolio to the Green Party-led Ministry of Environment after the 
2002 elections (Bruns, Ohlhorst, Wenzel, & Köppel, 2011, p. 205). Moreover, with the 
Green Party’s electoral victory in 1998, Hans-Josef Fell, one of the key protagonists in 
Germany’s grassroots solar energy scene, became a member of the German parliament, 
able to influence further developments at the federal level (Mautz & Byzio, 2005, p.79) 
and act as a policy entrepreneur in support of the sector (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Final-
ly, in terms of state-level policy, Nordrhein-Westfalen represented the frontrunner with is 
program for renewable energy and energy efficiency managed by its state energy agency 
(Fuchs & Wassermann, 2012; Mautz & Byzio, 2005).  
The growing solar energy sector also led to the creation of the Federal Solar Industry Asso-
ciation (Bundesverband Solarindustrie, BSi), which consolidated the activities of several 
existing industry groups (Bruns, Ohlhorst, Wenzel, & Köppel, 2011, p. 203). With employ-
ment reaching 10,000 to 12,000 in the German solar energy sector (IEA-PVPS, 2004, p. 18), 
this new organization added to the growing strength of existing lobbying organizations, in-
cluding the German Society for Solar Energy (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Solarenergie, DGS), 
the Association for Solar Energy (Solarenergie-Förderverein, SFV) and the German-led 
EUROSOLAR as well as hundreds of local solar initiatives (Drücke, Nurr, & Stryi-Hipp, 2004).  
Another factor which allegedly helped in garnering political support for the sector was the 
threat from major PV suppliers Siemens and Angewandte Solarenergie GmbH (ASE, later 
RWE Schott and Schott) in the mid-1990s to discontinue production lines in Germany and 
concentrate their activities in the more promising US market (Fuchs & Wassermann, 2012, 
p. 235; Ristau, 1998). At the same time, these negotiations represented an expression of 
remaining reservations among politicians, mainly due to the high costs of solar energy 
compared to wind power. The reservations also found expression in the renewable energy 
law (EEG) passed in 2000, which limited the solar feed-in tariff to an additional 350 MW of 
installed capacity.  
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3.1.2 Market formation 
Despite these reservations, the period from 1999 to 2003 represented a preliminary growth 
phase of the German TIS for solar PV (see Figure 1). The key driver of market growth was 
the government-funded 100,000-roof program, which was complemented by a feed-in tariff 
of DM 0,99 (approximately €0,50) per kWh starting in 2000. The former represented a capi-
tal subsidy in the form of a soft loan program operated by KfW, the German state-owned 
development bank. This program ran from 1999 to 2003 until the cap of 350 MW of addi-
tional installed capacity had been reached. During this period, it enabled the dynamic de-
velopment of the German market for privately-owned (i.e. non-commercial), grid-
connected rooftop PV systems, which received the most favorable financing conditions un-
der the program (Bruns et al., 2011, pp. 197-199; KfW, 2004, p.45). Additional market 
support during this period came from a number of federal states, most importantly Nord-
rhein-Westfalen with its REN Program (Program for the Rational Use of Energy and Use of 
Inexhaustible Energy Sources) as well as a growing number of municipal governments who 
had introduced cost-covering feed-in tariffs during this period (Bruns et al., 2011; Mautz & 
Byzio, 2005). As a result of these programs, Germany’s cumulative installed capacity had 
reached more than 400 MW by the end of 2003 (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 
2012).  
Figure 1:  Global Annual Photovoltaic Installations and Production by Country from 2000 to 
2003 (in MW) 
 
Source: Earth Policy Institute Database. Available at: http://www.earth-policy.org/data_center/   
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3.1.3 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
The growing small-size, rooftop market was primarily being supplied with cells and mod-
ules produced by the solar divisions or subsidiaries of well-established multinational firms 
from Japan (Kyocera, Sharp), the US/Europe (BP Solar, Siemens/Shell Solar), and the Ger-
man firm ASE (later RWE Schott and Schott), a subsidiary of RWE, one of Germany’s four 
large energy companies. These large firms accounted for about two thirds of sales 
throughout the program’s lifetime (KfW, 2004, p. 49). In addition, the market enabled the 
growth of a number of solar manufacturing start-ups, which had entered the market during 
the mid- to late-1990s, including firms like Q-Cells, Solon, Solarfabrik, Conergy, Solarwatt, 
ErSol, Solara, to name a few. A handful of firms were also founded during the early 2000s. 
Most importantly SolarWorld, which had functioned as an installer and distributor during 
the 1990s, entered the manufacturing business with the acquisition of production lines 
from a number of existing firms, including Bayer Solar. Moreover, Wacker Chemie, an es-
tablished producer of polysilicon, increased its production for the PV industry (Räuber, 
2005, p. 163-164). Finally, by 2003, most of today’s major German PV equipment suppliers 
had entered the market. Most of them were established firms with experience in adjacent 
or related markets like semiconductors, glass manufacturing and wet chemistry.  
With these old and new players, Germany had substantial production capacity along the 
entire value chain. By 2003, Germany had replaced the US as second largest producer of 
cells and modules, accounting for over 80 MW and 110MW of annual production (IEA_PVPS, 
2003, 2002). Nevertheless, in 2003 Japan still accounted for over 50 percent of global pro-
duction of cells and modules, and more than half of Germany’s demand was being met by 
foreign-produced products (KfW, 2004, p.49).  
3.1.4 Resource mobilization 
As indicated above, resource mobilization on the demand side was primarily enabled by 
the KfW loan program and was dominated by small scale investments from private house-
holds. Towards the end of the program, not only commercial investors (26%) but also in-
vestment vehicles created by private households for tax purposes (13%) increased their 
share of investments (KfW, 2004, p. 43). The latter included local initiatives aimed at es-
tablishing community-owned solar energy plants (Mautz & Byzio, 2005, p. 81-82).  
On the supply side, the boom of the “New Economy” during the 1990s helped facilitate ac-
cess to capital from private investors. While a number of IPOs were launched during this 
period, including SolarWorld, Sunways and Solarfabrik, the bulk of external funding came 
from private sources (Jennings, Margolis, & Bartlett, 2008, p. 6). Combined with rising cor-
porate profits, this enabled steady investment growth, reaching an annual volume of €159 
million in 2003 (Ruhl, Lütter, & Schmidt, 2008, p. 12). During this period, investments in 
German solar firms dominated the global industry, accounting for 77%, 87% and 38% of 
FFU-Report 06-2013: Co-evolution in the Solar Energy Sector 11 
 
 
global investments in the years 2001 to 20032. Investments in production lines were fre-
quently financed with subsidies mainly financed by Länder (German federal States) gov-
ernments. Nordrhein-Westfalen, Bavaria as well as a number of East German states 
emerged as facilitators of the growing number of production facilities (Brachert, Hornych, 
& Franz, 2013, p. 8; Ristau, 1998, p. 57-66). For example, the firm Q-Cells, founded in 
Thalheim, Sachsen-Anhalt in 1999, financed approximately one third of its investments 
with EU structural funds and subsidies from the government of Sachsen-Anhalt (Nölting, 
2009, p.44). Other examples are Berlin’s Solon, which received €6 million in public start-up 
funding, and ASE (later Schott), which received public funding from Länder-governments in 
Baden-Württemberg (€10 million) and Bavaria (€20 million) as well as the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Research (€12 million for two projects) (Ristau, 1998, p. 64)3. 
3.1.5 Development of scale economies and cost reduction 
As outlined above, up to 2003 the German market was still dominated by large, interna-
tional players operating in an oligopolistic market. Hence, the dynamics of cost reduction 
within the German market have to be viewed through this international lens. As data from 
the 100,000-rooftop program show (see Table 1), both module and overall system prices 
declined during this period. However, module prices declined less rapidly and actually in-
creased by approximately 10 percent in 2001, thus departing from the international trend 
and causing an overall increase in system prices of about 6 percent for the year4.  
This is likely a result of the important boost in demand without a corresponding develop-
ment of local distribution channels or domestic supply. This was corrected from 2002, 
which is reflected in particular in the rapid reductions in installation charges. Despite an 
improved balance between domestic supply and demand (see Figure 1 above), module 
prices in Germany remained fairly stable compared to the 1990s (see Figure 2), when more 
significant cost reductions could be achieved by Japanese and US producers. Investments 
in the German solar industry were relatively fragmented during this period with little po-
tential for capturing economies of scale. Although Germany had the largest number of 
firms, ASE/RWE Schott remained the only firm with more than 20 MW of production capaci-
ty (until 2002). This compares to three firms in the US and five firms in Japan, including 
Sharp with more than 100 MW of production capacity (IEA-PVPS, 2002). In 2003, Q-Cells 
became the second firm with a cell production capacity of more than 20 MW in Germany 
(IEA-PVPS, 2003). 
                                            
 
2
 Percentages are based on author’s own calculations based on data from Ruhl et al. (2008) and Jennings et al. 
(2008). 
3
 This includes a slight correction of the information in Ristau (1998), where he writes that €10 million was 
supplied by the government of Nordrhein-Westfalen for a factory in Gelsenkirchen. According to a former 
employee, this represents a factual error. Rather €10 million was supplied by the government of Baden-
Württemberg for a factory in Heilbronn. 
4
 Authors calculations based on KfW (2004, p. 48). 
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Table 1: Average costs for commercially-owned PV systems from 1999 to 2003 in € per kWp 
(only system up to 10kWp 
















1999 3,1 4758 831 693 602 6884 
2000 3,8 4499 (- 5%) 641 (- 22%) 484 (-30%) 509 (-15%) 6133 (-11) 
2001 4,2 4939 (+10%) 630 (-2%) 474 (-2%) 479 (-6%) 6522 (+6%) 
2002 4,9 4413 (-11) 564 (-10%) 373 (-21%) 429 (-10%) 5779 (-11%) 
2003 5,7 3816 (- 14) 527 (-7%) 303 (-19%) 330 (-23%) 5021 (-13%) 
Source: KfW (2004, p. 48) 
Figure 2: Average module prices in Germany from 1992 to 2004 in € per Wp 
 
Source: Kruck & Eltrop, (2004, p. 27)  
3.1.6 Knowledge development and diffusion 
In terms of research and development, Germany had also developed substantial capacity 
by the early 2000s. Most of the major German solar research institutes had been founded. 
These included institutes focused mainly or exclusively on solar energy research, such as 
the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems (ISE), the Leibniz Institute for Solar Ener-
gy Research in Hameln and the Centre for Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research Baden-
Württemberg (ZSW), as well as institutes with important activities on photovoltaics within 
a broader research agenda, including the Bavarian Centre for Applied Energy Research, the 
Hahn-Meitner Institute in Berlin, the Leibniz Institute for Crystal Growth (IKZ), the Insti-
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tute of Technical Thermodynamics of the German Aerospace Centre, the For-
schungszentrum Jühlich, among others. Moreover, since 1990, the research community was 
organized in the Research Association for Solar Energy (FVS, renamed Research Association 
Renewable Energy in 2009), allowing for coordination not only among the research com-
munity but also with the industry and policy makers. In terms of public R&D spending, 
Germany ranked third behind Japan and the US for most of the 1990s (Räuber, 2005, 
p.152). Correspondingly, Germany consistently took third place in international patent reg-
istrations5.  
3.1.7 Influence on the direction of search 
During this first growth phase, two key factors influencing the direction of search in the 
sector can be identified. On the demand side, the governmental 100,000 roof program be-
came the major driver of market growth, so that its funding guidelines became a crucial 
determinant of market developments. As indicated above, the program prioritized private-
ly-owned, rooftop systems, which accounted for the vast majority of installations during 
the program’s funding period.  
In the sphere of technology development, public R&D funding remained the central driver, 
supplying more than twice as much funding compared to private actors6. The government’s 
4th Energy Research Program (1996-2005) supplied funding to the PV sector via the Ministry 
of Environment and the Ministry of Education and Research. While the former pursued a 
balanced approach focused on cost reduction in silicon-based PV, system integration and 
development of thin film technologies, the latter exclusively financed the development of 
thin film technologies (Federal Ministry of Economy and Labor, 2005). In terms of funding, 
approximately 47 percent of overall funding went to the development of silicon-based 
technologies, 40 percent to thin film and other alternative PV technologies, while the re-
maining funds supported system integration (Prognos, Fraunhofer ISE, IE, IWR, & 
WindGuard, 2007). 
3.1.8 Positive externalities  
During this early period, a key positive externality was generated by policy experiments at 
the local level. The proliferation of local cost-covering feed-in tariffs provided the needed 
experience to convince policy makers at the federal level of the viability of such a scheme. 
Moreover, it demonstrated how a scheme differentiated by type of technology could work 
and enabled policy makers to respond rapidly with the amendment of the Renewable Ener-
gy Act when the 100,000 roof program expired (Mautz & Byzio, 2005, p. 79). Within the in-
                                            
 
5
 Based on patent data provided by the Fraunhofer Institute for System and Innovation Research.  
6
 Based on company data in Ruhl et al. (2008, p. 20) and data on public spending in IEA PVPS(1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003). Given the fact that firms may include public R&D subsidies in their company figures on R&D 
spending, the ration be skewed even more strongly towards public R&D funding.  
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dustry, a key step forward was the emergence of equipment suppliers with divisions dedi-
cated exclusively to the PV sector, significantly lowering the barriers to entry in the sec-
tor. Previously, newly founded firms had been highly dependent on accessing the expertise 
of established international players like Siemens/Shell, BP Solar and others7. Finally, the 
increasing number of system integrators as well as the first commercially oriented financ-




In China, the government’s endorsement of renewable energy in general and solar energy 
in particular was still comparatively weak in the period up to 2003. In principle the poten-
tial role of solar energy had been acknowledged, however primarily as an option for pro-
moting rural electrification in remote areas. In 1996, the government launched the New 
and Renewable Energy Development Program (1996-2010) (World Bank, 1999), and follow-
ing from this a number of rural electrification programs were launched. Important support 
for these initiatives came from the international level. The Brightness Program, aimed to 
supply 23 million people with renewable energy by 2010, was part of an international initi-
ative launched at the World Solar Peak Conference in Zimbabwe in 1996 (NREL, 2004a). 
Other important support came from programs sponsored by the German development 
agencies, the World Bank’s China Renewable Energy Development Program (CREDP) (World 
Bank, 1999)and the UNDP’s Capacity Building for the Rapid Commercialization of Renewa-
ble Energy, which facilitated the creation of China’s Renewable Energy Industries Associa-
tion (CREIA) in 2000 (UN, 2007). Renewable energies gained further legitimacy when the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) proposed its Tenth Five-Year Plan for Sus-
tainable Development. This included the Tenth Five-Year Plan for New and Renewable En-
ergy Commercialization Development (2001-2005) with the goal to increase the production 
capacity for solar cells to 53 MW (NREL, 2004b). Despite these targets, however, the gov-
ernment did not consider solar PV a mature technology with potential for large scale com-
mercialization (Martin, 2011, p. 27). In other words, while a number of foundations for 
boosting the legitimacy of the PV sector in China had been laid, it remained a niche tech-
nology without any strategic relevance for the central government. 
3.2.2 Market formation 
Rural electrification programs represented the main source of demand for solar PV systems 
in China up to about 2007. The first major deployment program was the Brightness Pro-
gram, which began piloting in 1996 and was finally launched in 1999, followed by the 
                                            
 
7
 Based on interviews with industry experts.  
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Township Electrification Program or Song Dian Dao Xiang (2001-2004). These government-
financed programs were based on a competitive bidding process, where system providers 
competed for tenders to install off-grid systems in unelectrified villages. The focus was on 
solar home systems, village PV systems and a small number of hybrid PV-wind systems (Ku, 
Lew, & Ma, 2003; NREL, 2004a, 2004b; Seng, 2009). Another scheme supported by the 
World Bank-financed CREDP provided a subsidy of $1,50 to $2 per Watt to accredited PV 
system companies, which enabled a market for solar home systems in remote rural areas 
(World Bank, 1999). These three major programs were complemented by a number of rural 
electrification projects funded by bilateral donor agencies, most of which came online 
from 2001 (Shyu, 2010).  
As a result of these various programs, the country’s cumulative installed capacity in-
creased from 19MW in 2000 to 52 MW in 2003 (Honghua, Dou, Sicheng, & Fang, 2012, p.7). 
The vast majority of installations were in the area of off-grid applications (96 percent), 
mainly rural applications (51 percent) and applications in the telecommunications sector 
(Sicheng, 2006). In terms of global market share, these developments remained insignifi-
cant, representing well below 1 percent of global installed capacity. For the country’s pio-
neering firms, however, it represented a key learning opportunity. Until 2003, Yingli, Sun-
tech and Trina generated the majority of their revenue from domestic sales. In fact, until 
2002, Trina and Suntech still depended exclusively on domestic demand.8  
3.2.3 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
With growing domestic and international demand, Chinese production of solar modules and 
cells began increasing from the low levels of the late 1990s. Between 1999 and 2003, pro-
duction grew from approximately 2,5MW to an estimated 35MW (Li, 2004, p.78). This com-
pares to 20 MW in India and more than 110 MW in Germany (IEA-PVPS, 2003). Simultane-
ously, the company mix began to shift. The first wave of companies, created in the 70s and 
80s, had been exclusively state-owned and focused exclusively on the small domestic mar-
ket with entire production lines imported from the US (Marigo, 2007, p. 146). This was fol-
lowed by a second wave of state-owned firms, which emerged at the local level to supply 
modules and systems to regional deployment programs within the scheme of the Brightness 
Program (Zhang & White, 2012, p. 11).  
Finally, in the late 1990s to early 2000s, a first group of privately-held enterprises 
emerged, including both domestic companies and a number of ventures with foreign par-
ticipation, such as Canadian Solar Inc. (CSI) (Canada), Kyocera-Tianjin and Hebei Ningjin 
Songgong Semiconductor (both Japan). The most important entrants were Trina (1997), 
Yingli (1998), Suntech (2001) and CSI (2001).While these new companies profited from ear-
ly sales in the government-sponsored rural electrification programs (Zhang & White, 2012, 
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 Based on company annual reports. No exact sales data is available for Yingli prior to 2004.  
16 R. Quitzow 
 
p. 36), their commercial orientation soon led them to target the booming European mar-
ket. In terms of their entry, they all pursued unique trajectories. Trina began as a system 
integrator for the Brightness Program, and CSI began producing solar batteries for the au-
tomobile sector. Suntech and Yingli both entered the business as module producers. How-
ever, Yingli had begun pursuing a strategy of vertical integration by 2002, while Suntech 
focused on adding further module production facilities.  
While key production equipment was still imported mainly from Europe and the US, com-
panies began sourcing components domestically as well (Davila, Foster, & Jia, 2009; 
Marigo, 2007). The ability to source auxiliary equipment locally, while striking a cost-
effective balance between automation and the use of the relatively abundant supply of 
skilled labor was viewed as one of the main sources of competitive advantages by these pi-
oneering firms (Davila et al., 2009; Suntech Power Holdings, 2005). Despite these dynamic 
changes in the country’s solar industry, until 2003 domestic demand in the form of the var-
ious rural electrification programs actually outstripped supply. As a result, international 
players, including Siemens, Astropower, Sharp, Kyocera, Shell and BP Solar received ac-
creditation as suppliers to the government-sponsored deployment programs and retained 
an important share of the market (Ku et al., 2003).  
3.2.4 Resource mobilization 
On the demand side, the largest share of funding for domestic market development came 
from the central government. This was complemented with funds from provincial govern-
ments in the Western part of the country as well as international donors. In addition, the 
World Bank’s CREDP, which accounted for approximately 1,7MW of installed capacity by 
2003 (Bhattacharyya & Ohiare, 2012, p. 682), was able to mobilize funds from firms and 
households. With only a partial subsidy, users were obliged to invest their own funds to 
purchase systems under the scheme.  
On the supply-side, investments in manufacturing capacity were fully government or do-
nor-funded until the late 1990s and had the character of demonstration projects (Li, 
2004).The new generation of firms entering the industry at the turn of the century repre-
sented commercial ventures. Their emergence coincided with the transition from a cen-
trally-controlled system of financing new technology-based ventures to an increasingly de-
centralized and more commercially-driven system of capital provision. In this evolving sys-
tem, an increasing number of local government-, university- and corporate-backed venture 
capital funds collaborate with local governments and state-owned enterprises to facilitate 
the funding of promising start-up companies (White, Gao, & Zhang, 2005). Following this 
pattern, the early ventures in the PV industry, such as Yingli and Suntech, financed their 
companies with a combination of their private wealth and funding from state-owned VCs 
and local SOEs. Suntech’s founder, Dr. Zhengrong Shi, for instance, is known to have ap-
proached a series of local governments until he received support from the Wuxi govern-
ment in Jiangsu province in securing US$6 million in initial investment for his firm. Con-
tributing US$400,000 of his own funds as well as 14 patents that he owned, Dr. Shi re-
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ceived a 25 percent stake and the position of CEO (Batson, 2006; Davila et al., 2009; 
Marukawa, 2012). Yingli’s founder, Liansheng Miao, provided an initial investment of 
$600,000 before convincing a local industrial park operator, Baoding District Industrial De-
velopment Zone, to enter the venture as an equity investor (Zhang & White, 2012, p. 15). 
3.2.5 Cost reduction and development of scale economies 
According to reports on Suntech’s firm history, developing a low-cost approach for module 
manufacturing had always been the declared goal of the firm’s founder. In Dr. Shi’s initial 
business plan in 2001, he had proposed to bring the cost per Watt down from $5 to $3 per 
Watt (Davila et al., 2009; Knight, 2011). With the help of Suntech’s “flexible China-based, 
low-cost manufacturing model” (Suntech Power Holdings, 2005, p. 2), he allegedly 
achieved this goal by 2003 (Batson, 2006). After establishing a first 10MW production line 
2002, the firm had quickly expanded its capacity to a total of 25 MW by December 2003. 
This second production line was less reliant on ready to use European equipment and inte-
grated a number of lower cost, domestic components as well as used machinery purchased 
from Italy and Japan. Moreover, in an effort to leverage the availability of low-cost Chi-
nese labor, the firm established a “semi-automated manufacturing model” (Batson, 2006; 
Davila et al., 2009; Suntech Power Holdings, 2005). In addition, the firm made efforts to 
reduce material costs by developing a process for utilizing lower grade silicon wafers. 
While less detailed information is available on Yingli’s activities during this time, it pur-
sued a similar strategy based on a “balanced combination of advanced automated manu-
facturing equipment and low-cost skilled labor” (Yingli Green Energy Holding, 2007, p. 
111).  
3.2.6 Knowledge development and diffusion 
Knowledge development in the field of solar energy has been supported by the Chinese 
government since the late 1950s, albeit at a relatively limited scale. By the 1970s, first 
ventures into the development of manufacturing capacities were made. By 2001, approxi-
mately 30 institutes and universities were involved in R&D related to the PV sector. Public 
R&D funding has increased slowly but steadily, reaching an estimated US$2,4 million during 
the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and US$5,2-6,2 million during the 10th Five-Year Plan 
(2001-2005).The focus of this public R&D support has mainly been on materials and the 
manufacturing process (Marigo, 2007, p 146-147). Moreover, since 2000, these activities 
have increasingly addressed specific bottlenecks in the development of China’s PV value 
chain. Most notably, this has included activities to develop technological capacities in the 
production of equipment for the PV industry (Yang et al., 2003, p. 704) as well as a fo-
cused effort in the field of purified silicon production (de la Tour, Glachant, & Ménière, 
2011; Fischer, 2012).  
While these efforts may have supported the development of China’s overall technological 
capacities in the sector, by themselves they were not sufficient to jump-start the dynamic 
industrial development since 2000. More important was the acquisition of key expertise 
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from abroad, which occurred via two important channels. The first mechanism was the re-
turn of experienced, foreign-trained Chinese professionals (de la Tour et al., 2011, p. 764-
765). Suntech’s Dr. Shi is the most well-known example of this process. Before founding 
Suntech in 2001, he had acquired his PhD at the world renowned School of Photovoltaic 
and Renewable Engineering at the University of New South Wales (Australia) and spent al-
most 10 years as director of research at the Australian PV company Pacific Solar (Knight, 
2011). Similarly, Dr. Shawn Qu, the founder and CEO of CSI, holds a PhD in material sci-
ence from a Canadian university and gained extensive experience working on PV-related 
technologies in Canada. A second important channel was the import of equipment from 
suppliers in Europe and the US along with the engineering services to enable their efficient 
use. Under the able leadership of their foreign-trained executives, this enabled these early 
manufacturing firms to integrate the latest production equipment into their PV manufac-
turing lines. Additional support came from a number of German solar manufacturers who 
helped in bringing production processes up to European standards9. 
3.2.7 Influence on the direction of search 
During this early period of industrial development, Chinese actors were mainly focused on 
establishing their first lines of production and attaining international standards of quality 
and efficiency, while reducing costs. China’s rural electrification programs served as a 
learning ground for some of these early players, including Trina, Yingli and Suntech (Zhang 
& White, 2012, p. 36). However, the target market was the growing German market. Cor-
respondingly, important aims of these companies in the early years were to obtain interna-
tional quality certifications and develop international marketing channels (Davila et al., 
2009; Yingli Green Energy Holding, 2007).  
3.2.8 Development of positive externalities 
During the period to 2003, the Chinese pioneer firms played a key role in developing posi-
tive externalities, from which the second wave of firms would reap the benefits in the fol-
lowing years. As Zhang & White (2012) have argued, these early movers played an essential 
role in overcoming the industry’s “liability of newness” in China. They established firms in 
the solar PV sector as recognized high-technology enterprises and demonstrated the ability 
to compete with more established international players. Most importantly, this provided 
the basis for accessing funding and other forms of support from local governments. Other 
benefits included greater ease in attracting well-trained returnees and international indus-
try experts (Zhang & White, 2012, p. 35) and easier access to equipment from European 
and US suppliers who began to establish distribution channels during this period. 
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 Based on interviews with industry experts. 
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4 The growth phase: the functional dynamics of the TIS for solar pho-
tovoltaic technology in China and Germany from 2004 to 2010 
In the following section, the further development of the German and Chinese TIS from 
2004 to 2010 is described in detail. Developments in both countries are described sepa-
rately, while alluding to emerging transnational linkages between the two countries as well 
as key third countries, in so far as they support one of the eight system functions.   
4.1.1 Legitimation 
With the conclusion of the 100,000-roof program in 2003, the solar energy sector in Ger-
many had built up significant momentum. Second only to Japan in terms of both market 
and industrial capacity, the sector had developed significant political weight. Correspond-
ingly, sustaining the emergent solar industry played a central role in justifying the increase 
of the feed-in tariff for solar energy in late 2003 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003, p. 1).  
The subsequent growth of the solar industry added to the further professionalization of its 
lobbying organization. In 2006, another merger took place between the BSi and the Un-
ternehmensvereinigung Solarwirtschaft (UVS), yielding the industry’s current Bun-
desverband Solarwirtschaft (BSW) (Bruns et al., 2011, p. 204). By 2007, the BSW staff had 
reached 25 employees, and by 2009 the association represented a total of 750 companies 
in the solar industry10. Moreover, the activities of the BSW and its umbrella organization, 
the Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien, received increasing support from the govern-
ment. The associations launched joint campaigns with the Federal Ministry of the Environ-
ment, such as the solar energy week and a campaign promoting renewable energies. The 
latter led to the creation of an agency for the promotion of renewable energy (Agentur für 
Erneuerbare Energien) in 2008. In addition, in 2007, the German association of equipment 
producers created a section focused on the PV sector.  
From 2009, support for the renewable sector weakened at the federal level, due to the 
election of a conservative government. Although no fundamental changes to the renewable 
energy law were made, the decision to increase the lifetime of the country’s nuclear pow-
er plants in 2010 was widely perceived as a negative sign for the continued expansion of 
renewable energies. This threat was short lived, however. After the nuclear meltdown in 
Japan in 2011, the government not only reversed this decision in light of widespread public 
pressure, but the conservative political parties were also forced to accept the inevitability 
of Germany’s so-called Energiewende (energy transition), establishing a firm national con-
sensus in this regard (Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, 2011; Tenbrock & 
Vorholz, 2011).  
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 Based on http://www.solarwirtschaft.de/ueber-uns/historie.html.  
20 R. Quitzow 
 
Finally, with module producers beginning to cluster in the former East Germany, govern-
ments in Thüringen, Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt emerged as additional supporters of the 
industry. The visibility of the regional cluster was further strengthened with the creation 
of a cluster initiative entitled “Solar Valley Mitteldeutschland” in 2008, receiving support 
from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as well as the respective Län-
der governments11. The importance of the Länder-governments in sustaining support for 
the solar energy industry has gained particular visibility from 2010, when the conservative 
government launched attempts to first reduce the PV feed-in tariff and then make more 
fundamental changes to the renewable energy law. In both cases, drastic changes were 
prevented by Länder-governments represented in the country’s upper chamber, the Bun-
desrat (Bauchmüller, 2012; Bundesrat, 2010). 
4.1.2 Market formation 
After revisions to the solar feed-in tariff were confirmed by the Bundestag in December 
2003, market growth in Germany took off in 2004 (see Figure 3). The feed-in tariff had 
been increased to a maximum of 57,4 cents per kWh for small rooftop systems of up to 
30KW, while ground-mounted installations received 45,6 cents per kWh. Although these 
rates were subject to an automatic annual reduction of the feed-in tariff by 5 percent, the 
law no longer included any cap or other limit to the feed-in tariff, providing additional in-
vestment security to project developers. The result was a quadrupling of annual installed 
capacity in 2004 to 670 MW, making Germany the world’s largest market for solar energy 
systems. In 2005, the market grew by additional 40 percent, yielding 951 MW of installed 
capacity (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 2012, p. 21). At the same time, a trend to-
wards progressively larger PV systems reemerged with MW-scale systems accounting for 
approximately 15 percent of the market in 2004 and 2005 (Chrometzka, 2011). In 2004, the 
first 5 MW solar park, the world’s largest at the time, was constructed (IEA-PVPS, 2004, 
p.9).  
In 2006, the market slowed down slightly (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 2012, p. 
21), due to supply shortages and rising module prices. However, by 2007, these price in-
creases could be compensated by rising efficiencies in the balance of systems. This ena-
bled overall system prices to decline in Germany, so that the market grew by a further 50 
percent in 2007 and 2008 with the share of MW-plants increasing to over 20 percent of to-
tal installations in 2009. In 2009, with module prices suddenly declining sharply, the mar-
ket grew by over 100 percent, reaching more than 4 GW of annual installed capacity. De-
spite various ad hoc measures to reduce the feed-in tariff , this trend continued in 2010 
with over 7 GW of installed capacity that year (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 2012; 
Fraunhofer ISE, 2012). 
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Figure 3: Global Annual PV Installations and Production Capacity by country from 2004 to 
2010 in MWp 
 
Source: Earth Policy Institute Database. Available at: http://www.earth-policy.org/data_center/ 
4.1.3 Entrepreneurial experimentation  
In Germany, the market boom from 2004 to 2010 was primarily shaped by a small number 
of leading PV manufacturers, while the number of new entrants in the field of crystalline 
silicon-bases PV declined compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s. In addition, the sec-
tor was characterized by a dynamic development of German solar equipment suppliers. 
The overall sector was characterized by a high investment ratio, ranging from 14 to 25 
percent12. Nevertheless, German investments in production capacity lagged behind the dy-
namic market developments described in the previous section, and domestic firms have 
consistently supplied less than 50 percent of German demand (EuPD, 2009).  
On the manufacturing side, the most ambitious firms were Q-Cells and SolarWorld. Both in-
vested heavily during these years, though pursuing very different strategies. Q-Cells placed 
its major focus on rapidly expanding capacity in its core business of producing silicon-
based solar cells, while investing heavily in new technologies via investments in joint ven-
tures and start-up companies. In 2007 and 2008, these investments made Q-Cells the 
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world’s largest producer of solar cells with an annual capacity of 516MW and an export ra-
tio of 60 percent, rising to 760MW and 70 percent in 2008 (IEA-PVPS, 2007, 2008). With the 
development of a facility in Malaysia, total cell production capacity had reached more 
than 1,2 GW by 201013. 
SolarWorld, on the other hand, pursued a strategy focused on capacity expansion and ver-
tical integration in the production and distribution of silicon-based solar modules. With its 
origins as a distributor of PV systems, the company had always maintained a presence in 
the downstream segment. This was further expanded with the acquisition of a 29 percent 
stake in the project developer Solarparc AG in 2006. Simultaneously, manufacturing capac-
ity was progressively expanded mainly via acquisitions and across all steps of the supply 
chain. Moreover, the firm’s initial emphasis on wafer production was reduced, as the rela-
tive share of cell and module production increased. By 2010, Solar World’s wafer and mod-
ule production capacity had reached almost 1 GW, while cells lagged slightly behind with 
775 MW. This expansion strategy went hand in hand with the development of a second cen-
ter of production in the US, which was acquired via the purchase of Shell Solar in 2006. 
Thereafter, about two thirds of total cell and module production and about a quarter of 
wafer production were situated in the US14. 
In addition to these two heavyweights, around 10 to 15 module producers progressively in-
creased their capacity during this period, while expanding their activities in the down-
stream segments of the value chain. The largest of these was Solon with 412 MW (2010) 
followed by handful of producers with 200 to 250 MW production capacity. Companies with 
significant cell manufacturing capacities included Schott Solar (former RWE Schott), Sun-
ways, ErSol and manufacturing newcomer Conergy. The latter had established its first fully 
integrated manufacturing line in 2007. Among these, Schott Solar and Conergy were the 
only vertically integrated companies until Germany’s industrial heavyweight Bosch entered 
the sector in 2008. With the acquisition of ErSol (merged with wafer producer ASI Indus-
tries in 2006) and module supplier Aleo Solar, Bosch established itself as the third major 
German manufacturer. 
In tandem with this expansion of manufacturing capacity, the German equipment suppliers 
also made important investments during this period. A number of equipment suppliers 
made entries into the PV sector, while a number of existing suppliers invested heavily in 
the expansion of their PV activities. The larger firms established divisions or even separate 
subsidiaries dedicated exclusively to the solar sector. By 2006, the three largest suppliers, 
Centrotherm, Roth und Rau and the Schmid Group, had developed offerings for turnkey 
production lines. To establish and further develop these offerings, these firms invested 
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heavily in firm acquisitions to obtain needed technological competences and increase the 
share of components produced in-house. Moreover, equipment offerings, in particular in 
the turnkey segment, went hand in hand with engineering and training services to support 
clients in putting new equipment and production lines into operation. Initially, these cli-
ents were primarily European manufacturers, however, as early as 2007 Asian manufactur-
ers represented roughly half of total turnover, a figure which had risen to about 67 percent 
by 2011 (Wessendorf, 2012). In the turnkey segment, Asian manufacturers have represent-
ed an even larger share of demand15.  
4.1.4 Resource mobilization 
On the demand side, the revised solar feed-in tariff provided the basis for an investment 
boom in solar PV installations. Investments in PV systems rose progressively from €1,5 bil-
lion in 2004. This was followed by a doubling of annual investment in 2005 and again in 
2008, reaching an annual expenditure of €6,2 billion. In 2009, investments reached €9,6 
billion and then peaked at €19,5 billion in 2010 before dropping back to €15 billion the fol-
lowing year (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 2005, 2006a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a). As 
these numbers show, investments in installations in Germany appear to have been largely 
unaffected by the turbulence of the global financial crisis.  
Partly, this may be a result of the fact that KfW has continued to provide low-interest 
loans for the financing of solar energy systems. Evaluations of the KfW renewable portfo-
lio, which were conducted for the years 2007 to 2011, indicate that from 2007 to 2010 KfW 
provided finance for 40 to 50 percent of all PV systems installed in Germany during that 
period. Depending on the program, loans were capped at €50,000, €500,000, €1 million or 
€10 million. In the years 2009 and 2010, a special program in response to the financial cri-
sis even offered loans of up to €25 million, thus helping to bridge potential financing gaps 
(Bickel & Kelm, 2010; Bickel et al., 2008; Bickel, Kelm, & Edler, 2009, 2011, 2012). Addi-
tional finance was provided by Germany’s rural development bank (Landwirtschaftliche 
Rentenbank). In the peak years of 2009 and 2010, it provided farmers with loans for financ-
ing PV systems of €993 million and just under €1,2 billion, respectively 
(Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, 2011, p. 36). This amounts to approximately 10 and 6 
percent of total investment in new installations in the respective years16.  
In addition, local banks and Sparkassen became important providers of capital for the large 
number of smaller, privately owned systems. As system sizes began to increase, project-
based, non-recourse financing models became increasingly important. Due to the existing 
experiences with wind energy projects, acquiring the needed debt financing was not a sig-
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24 R. Quitzow 
 
nificant challenge. Important lenders included the State-owned HSH Nordbank and Nord LB 
as well as the Commerzbank, all with significant experience in the wind sector. In addi-
tion, the Southern-based Bayern LB and LBBW played an important role, due to their prox-
imity to many of the projects17.  
Despite the increasing share of larger projects, equity for the majority of projects still 
came from individuals and farmers, accounting for 39 and 21 percent of installed capacity 
in 2010 (Solarpraxis, 2012, p. 28). Equity for the larger projects initially came primarily 
from project developers themselves. Additionally, the first local solar energy cooperatives 
emerged between 2003 and 2007 and increased rapidly from 2008. By 2010, an estimated 
150 to 200 solar energy cooperatives existed in Germany, mainly located in the former 
West German states. The majority of these cooperatives were initiated by existing cooper-
ative banks and mobilized investments in either a portfolio of rooftop systems or smaller 
ground-mounted solar energy parks (Holstenkamp & Ulbrich, 2010).  
Finally, by 2008, closed solar funds, which collect equity capital from private investors, 
emerged as a significant source of private capital for larger solar projects. In this model, 
investors become partners in a company (typically in the form of a GmbH&Co KG), which 
functions as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for one or several solar projects. In 2008, 
closed solar funds accounted for €68 million in equity, jumping to €477 million and €605 
million in 2009 and 2010, respectively18. On the one hand, this dynamic development was 
as a result of the time lag between the decline in module prices and the reduction of feed-
in tariffs, which made solar projects particularly attractive financial investments in 2009 
and 2010. On the other hand, it represented an important indicator for the increasing ma-
turity of the sector, enabling project developers to provide fund managers and investors 
with the needed securities to attract capital from individual private investors to off-
balance sheet, project-based investments.  
On the supply side, annual investments more than doubled in the years 2004 to 2006, 
amounting to €294 million, €668 million and €1,3 billion. From 2007, investment growth 
slowed down both in relative and in absolute terms. In 2007 and 2008, the totals were 
€1,866 and €2,183 billion respectively (Lütter, Uhlemann, Ammon, Otto, & Lohr, 2009, p. 
12). At the same time, Germany’s share of global investment decreased during this period. 
By 2007, Germany only accounted for 15 percent of total global investments, compared to 
a high of almost 90 percent in 2002. Moreover, the period before 2005 had been dominated 
by private investments. In 2005, public equity activity in the sector exploded globally, ac-
counting for approximately three quarters of total investment in the sector (Jennings et 
al., 2008).That year Q-Cells launched the largest German IPO to date, raising €240 million. 
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Other major IPOs included Centrosolar (€49 million, initially via Regulated Unofficial Mar-
ket in Frankfurt), Conergy in 2006 (€100 million), and Aleo Solar (€38,5 million) in 2007. 
Among the equipment suppliers, Centrotherm Photovoltaics (€134 million) launched the 
largest IPO in 200719.  
Only the three major players Q-Cells, Solar World and Conergy followed up with major cap-
ital injections. Q-Cells relied heavily on the public equity, raising approximately €1 billion 
by issuing shares and convertible bonds from 2005 to 2010. SolarWorld only raised approx-
imately €250 million in equity, but issued over €1,3 billion in debt over the same period. 
Finally, Conergy raised more than €700 million in equity and over €600 million in debt20. In 
addition, German industrial heavyweight Bosch entered the PV sector in 2008, investing 
around €2 billion up to 2011. This included more than €1 billion for the acquisition of Ersol 
in 2008 and Aleo Solar for more than €100 million in 2009 (Brück, 2012; Werner, 2012).  
In addition to these market-driven funding mechanisms, German solar companies contin-
ued to benefit from public investment subsidies. In a number of East German regions, 
companies could receive cash grants from regional development funds of up to 30 to 50 
percent of total investment costs, depending on the size of the company (Grau, Huo, & 
Neuhoff, 2012, p. 27-30). These investment subsidies represented an important incentive 
for companies to develop facilities in the Eastern part of the country supporting a signifi-
cant concentration of manufacturing companies in the States of Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt 
and Thüringen (Brachert et al., 2013, p. 8). SolarWorld, for instance, recorded an average 
of €64 million in investment grants in its balance sheet during the period 2005 to 201021.  
Although the financial crisis affected the solar sector less severely than other industries, it 
did lead to constraints in accessing fresh financial capital, which led to a stagnation of 
global investments in 2009 (UNEP, 2012, p. 15). In Germany, the most tangible impact was 
the cancellation of Schott Solar’s IPO, which had been scheduled for September 2008 and 
was expected to raise more than half a billion Euros22. Q-Cells on the other hand raised 
€220 million in debt in 2008 and floated convertible bonds worth €250 million in 2009, in-
dicating their resilience to the turbulence in the capital markets. Conergy raised €400 mil-
lion in equity in 2008, and SolarWorld raised €75 and €85 million in debt in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively23.  
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4.1.5 Development of scale economies and cost reduction 
Rapid market development in Germany was accompanied by important reductions in sys-
tem prices. After a short increase in 2005 following the introduction of the new feed-in 
tariff, prices declined step by step (see Figure 4). By 2008 German systems were well be-
low averages in Japan and other major Western PV markets (IEA-PVPS, 2008, p. 28). Even 
Chinese system prices remained above average prices for utility-scale plants in the German 
market. Only in the rest of Asia were prices slightly lower (see Figure 5). An analysis of 
cost drivers in the US and Germany attributes Germany’s price advantage to the size and 
stability of the German market and the benefits related to this, such as lower market risks 
and greater competition among installers (Seel, Barbose, & Wiser, 2013).  
Declines in system prices have come in spite of rising module prices up to 2008, caused by 
supply-side constraints. A key bottleneck was the shortage in polysilicon, the main raw ma-
terial needed for the production of silicon-based solar cells. With less than ten major pro-
ducers, high capital intensity and response times of up to 3 years, this segment of the sup-
ply chain did not keep pace with the rapid market growth triggered by Germany’s feed-in 
tariff. As a result, prices for silicon sky-rocketed, reaching an average price of more than 
$100 per kg (Willeke & Räuber, 2012, p.33-35) and spot market prices of more than $450 
per kg by 2008 (US Department of Energy, 2011, p. 36). This impacted not only the cost of 
module production but also the willingness of cell and module producers to expand produc-
tion. As Q-Cells states in its 2005 annual report, “Our policy is to only expand our produc-
tion capacity when we have access to the corresponding raw materials...” (Q-Cells, 2006, 
p. 21). 
Figure 4: Annual installation of grid-connected PV capacity and development of prices for 
rooftop-systems below 10kWp in Germany 
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISE (2012) 
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Figure 5: Average prices and sizes of utility-scale solar power plants 
 
Source: IRENA (2012, p. 27) 
To secure a stable supply of polysilicon, manufacturers entered long-term supply agree-
ments with silicon producers. In some cases, this involved substantial pre-payments to help 
silicon producers expand production. Panel makers were thus forced to shoulder not only 
part of the investment risk but a significant portion of the financing costs. In addition, wa-
fer producers PV Crystalox and Solar World both invested in their own production of pol-
ysilicon. To mitigate the rise in silicon prices German manufacturers also pursued efforts 
to reduce the use of silicon in cell production and to develop methods for recycling the 
material from waste generated in the production process. Q-Cells, for instance, reduced 
wafer thickness by almost 50 percent between 2003 and 2007, enabling the firm to keep 
material costs stable. Solar World, on the other hand, was able to source 20 percent of its 
silicon from recycled materials produced by its subsidiary Solar Material. Despite these ef-
forts, many producers slowed down the expansion of production capacity, so that the sup-
ply of solar modules in Germany continued to lag behind the growth in domestic and Euro-
pean demand. Especially smaller producers, such as Centrosolar, were constrained by the 
needed capital to secure the required silicon. As an alternative, a number of producers, 
including Q-Cells, Schott and Sunways, invested in the production of thin film solar mod-
ules24.  
                                            
 
24
 Information in this paragraph is based on the annual reports of the mentioned companies. 
28 R. Quitzow 
 
Towards the end of 2008, increased silicon production started easing the supply bottle-
neck. Increased availability of the raw material not only caused prices for polysilicon to 
fall from its high in early 2008 to approximately $50 per kg by mid-2009, it also enabled 
producers to utilize idle production capacity and boost their output. The simultaneous col-
lapse of the Spanish market and reductions in the German feed-in tariff helped module 
prices to fall from a high of close to €4 per W in mid-2008 to slightly over €2 per W for Eu-
ropean-made modules by the end of 2009 (US Department of Energy, 2011, p. 60) (see also 
Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Silicon and PV module prices from 2005 to 2012 
 
Source: de la Tour & Glachant (2013) 
These price reductions were partially underpinned by industry-wide economies of scale and 
real reductions in the cost of production. As specialized suppliers invested in scaling-up 
their production for the growing PV industry, this brought down prices for equipment and 
components25. Additionally, some of the larger German manufacturers tried to reduce costs 
by investing in production capacity in Asian countries. In 2007, Q-Cells and Solar World be-
gan to develop facilities in Malaysia and Korea, respectively. Additionally, Schott Solar had 
begun operating a production facility in the Czech Republic as early as 2004. From 2008 
the largest German manufacturers invested in further production capacity in an effort to 
exploit internal economies of scale. As mentioned above, by 2010, Bosch, Q-Cells and Solar 
World had all reached over 1 GW of capacity26.  
According to estimates in Kirkegaard, Hanemann, Weischer, & Miller (2010, p. 49), techno-
logical advances coupled with increasing economies of scale had brought module produc-
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FFU-Report 06-2013: Co-evolution in the Solar Energy Sector 29 
 
 
tion costs to approximately €1,35 per Watt by 2010, though no distinction is made across 
countries or firm types. The related assumptions are based on state of the art equipment 
and cell concepts as well as a polysilicon price of $60 per kg, which only partly reflected 
the cost structures of German manufacturers at the time. Among other things, manufac-
turers remained locked into wafer or polysilicon supply agreements with significantly high-
er prices. Hence, a significant portion of the price reduction had to be compensated by 
narrowing profit margins, resulting in the relative decline of stock valuation to turnover 
shown in Figure 7.  
Figure 7: Stock valuation relative to turnover 
 
Source: Fawer & Magyar (2011) 
4.1.6 Knowledge development and diffusion 
The period of 2004 to 2010 was characterized by important increases in the investments in 
research and development in Germany. This was driven both by increased government 
funding and increased funding from Germany’s booming solar energy industry. Government 
expenditures in R&D almost doubled from 2004 to 2005 to €32,3 million. In the following 
years, the annual R&D budget remained relatively stable, ranging from €31 million to €43 
million between 2006 and 2010. With that the PV sector received more public R&D invest-
ments than any other renewable energy technology in Germany over that period (Federal 
Ministry of the Environment, 2011b, p. 11). Only the US government invested more than 
Germany during this period (Willeke & Räuber, 2012, p. 10).  
R&D focused on traditional silicon-based solar cells received slightly over 50 percent of the 
total funding for the period 2005 to 2010. Over the same period, thin film technologies re-
ceived approximately 28 percent of funding with a particular boost in 2006 (48%) and 2007 
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(38%)27 (see also Figure 8). In particular in the field of traditional solar cells, the research 
scene was dominated by the Fraunhofer ISE. Among the active projects in the year 2007 
(including projects initiated in the preceding years), over 40 percent of funding was allo-
cated to projects individually implemented by the institute and an additional 8 to 9 per-
cent to projects with its participation, bringing the total to more than 50 percent. The 
ISFH remained a distant second accounting for 13 percent of funds allocated to research on 
silicon-based solar cells (only single partner projects)28.  
Figure 8: Distribution of public R&D funding, % of total  (2005 - 2010) 
 
Source: Federal Ministry of the Environment (2006b, 2007, 2008, 2009b, 2010b, 2011b) 
In addition to the relatively stable flow of public R&D funding, private R&D investments in-
creased in response to the rapidly increasing industry turnover. Having roughly matched 
public expenditures in 2004 and 2005, private R&D investments reached €65 million in 
2006, thus surpassing public expenditures for the first time. R&D expenditures continued 
to grow thereafter amounting to €163 million or more than five times the public budget by 
2008 (BSW & Solarpraxis, 2009, p. 31). Despite these important increases in absolute ex-
penditures, the share of R&D relative to industry turnover decreased from approximately 
2,8 percent in 2003 to figures ranging from approximately 1,5 to slightly over 2 percent29. 
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Given the fact that corporate R&D expenditures may also include funds acquired from pub-
lic sources, the real share of private R&D funding may be even lower than these figures 
suggest. SolarWorld for instance states in its annual reports that more than one third of its 
R&D investments in the years 2005 to 2007 were grant financed.  
A particular strength of the German R&D landscape has been the close collaboration be-
tween manufacturers and equipment suppliers (Nussbaumer, Biro, Haverkamp, & Bothe, 
2007). Moreover, the German PV industry, in particular in East Germany, is characterized 
by a high network density. In other words, the number of cooperative relationships is rela-
tively high compared to other industrial sectors in Germany, which also implies a relatively 
rapid diffusion of knowledge throughout the German solar industry (Brachert et al., 2013; 
Hornych & Brachert, 2010). These cooperative relationships were supported by a number 
of collaborative R&D projects funded by the Federal Ministry of the Environment as well as 
the State governments of Baden-Württemberg and Niedersachsen (Nussbaumer et al., 
2007). In addition, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research supported a cluster ini-
tiative known as “SolarValley Mitteldeutschland” in the Eastern States of Sachsen, Sach-
sen-Anhalt and Thüringen with a total of €150 million over the period 2008 to 2013 (Aulich 
& Frey, 2009).  
4.1.7 Influence on the direction of search 
In accordance with a tradition dating back to the year 1987, policy makers and a selected 
group of key stakeholders from industry and the research community discussed the strate-
gic direction of public R&D programs at the biannual “Glottertaler Gespräche” near Frei-
burg (Bruns et al., 2011, p. 172). In 2005, the participants of these discussions developed a 
roadmap to help identify key focus areas for research. From 2007, the Strategic Research 
Agenda developed by the European PV-technology platform served as the main reference 
point (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 2008, p. 14-15). According to the research 
agenda developed in 2005, twin goals of public R&D funding should be enhancing the com-
petitiveness of solar energy vis-à-vis conventional energy and securing Germany’s techno-
logical leadership in the PV sector (Federal Ministry of the Environment, 2006b, p. 12). To 
do so, R&D funding should focus on reducing the cost of silicon-based PV cells and mod-
ules, the further development of thin film technologies and system integration, a focus 
which was broadly maintained following the discussions in 2007 and 2009 (Federal Ministry 
of the Environment, 2008, 2010b). In addition, the strategists agreed that funding should 
encourage collaboration between research institutes and industry and focus on medium- to 
long term projects, averaging approximately five years (Federal Ministry of the 
Environment, 2010b, p. 19). Despite the goal of promoting collaborative R&D, projects in-
volving cooperation between firms and research institutes only accounted for about one 
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third of the funding volume. Approximately 10 percent of total funding went to projects, 
which involved both suppliers and manufacturers30. 
In addition to this public-private dialogue, a key influence on the direction of search re-
sulted from the silicon shortage mentioned above. From 2004 to 2008, producers placed 
particular emphasis on reducing wafer thickness and developing other ways to reduce the 
amount of silicon needed in the production process. Furthermore, it stimulated invest-
ments in the development of thin film technologies, which require only limited or no sili-
con31.  
4.1.8 Development of positive externalities 
Rapid market growth and industry development in Germany had important implications 
both domestically and internationally. Most importantly, the success of the German feed-in 
tariff inspired countries like Spain, Italy and the Czech Republic to invest in similar de-
mand-side subsidy schemes, thus triggering an unprecedented market boom. Moreover, the 
German market became a learning ground for established commercial players to enter the 
solar energy sector, ranging from investment banks and pension funds to specialized 
equipment producers. The scale and profitability of the German market combined with its 
stable policy and institutional framework offered a strong foundation for these firms to be-
come acquainted with the new industry before venturing into new, less predictable mar-
kets (Fulton & Mellquist, 2011).  
In addition, important cluster dynamics developed in East Germany where the accessibility 
of investment subsidies combined with high quality infrastructure and the availability of 
qualified personnel made greenfield investments very attractive. As indicated by Brachert 
et al. (2013), dense network ties enabled knowledge to diffuse within the industry. Even 
more importantly, Germany’s traditional strength in equipment production enabled im-
portant synergies between manufacturers and suppliers (Nussbaumer et al., 2007). Com-
bined with Germany’s strong export orientation, the resulting technological advances be-
came readily available to firms around the globe. A case in point is the focus among Ger-
man suppliers on the development of turnkey production lines, mainly intended for the de-
velopment of production capacity abroad (Heup & Rentzing, 2009).  
4.2 China 
4.2.1 Legitimation  
Starting at a relatively low level, the legitimation of the Chinese solar energy industry 
made a number of advances both in China and internationally during the growth period of 
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2004 to 2010. Domestically, the Renewable Energy Law, which went into effect on January 
1, 2006, represented an important milestone for the broader renewable energy sector. 
Among other things, it called for targets and a corresponding plan for the promotion of re-
newable energy development. In the Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renew-
able Energy, which followed in 2007, the solar energy targets remained very modest, how-
ever, aiming only at 300 MW of cumulative installed capacity by 2010. This compared to 5 
GW of targeted wind power capacity and 4 GW biomass-based energy generation capacity 
(Schuman & Lin, 2012, p.92).  
At the international level, Chinese firms also began the period with a modest reputation. 
Quality concerns and the lack of a certification infrastructure supplied producers with only 
weak legitimacy on the international market. An important boost in legitimacy came as a 
result of the supply shortages that emerged in Europe in response to the boom in demand. 
This mismatch between supply and demand facilitated growing sales of Chinese modules 
and cells in the German and other European market. Supply, distribution and licensing 
agreements with German brand name firms enabled Chinese pioneer firms to overcome ini-
tial customer hesitation and establish themselves as legitimate competitors in the German 
market (Hug & Schachinger, 2006). In fact, in 2005, Suntech entered a licensing agreement 
for the OEM production of solar modules for its main German competitor, SolarWorld The 
German firm became its largest single customer the following year. Other major customers 
in 2005 and 2006 were IBC Solar and Conergy (Suntech Power Holdings, 2005, 2007). While 
in 2005 Trina Solar still sold the majority of its products to smaller system integrators in 
Germany, by 2006 it had secured agreements with Conergy and Phönix Sonnenstrom AG 
(now Phoenix Solar AG) (Hug & Schachinger, 2006). Finally, in 2008, Q-Cells entered into 
an OEM agreement with SolarFun for the manufacturing of modules with its cells, which it 
then used in its emerging systems business (SolarFun Annual Report, 2009, p. 85). 
Another important avenue enabling Chinese manufacturers to establish their legitimacy in 
Germany and other international markets was via the certifications offered by major certi-
fication bodies. Of key importance for the German market have been TÜV Rheinland, the 
VDE Institut as well as its partner Fraunhofer ISE. While initially panels also entered the 
market without certifications, major producers began to acquire the relevant certifications 
by 2006. In certain cases, German manufacturers also helped acquire certifications for 
modules produced for them by Chinese firms under OEM agreements (Hug & Schachinger, 
2006). 
These inroads in the German market not only boosted the reputation of Chinese solar 
products internationally, it also built momentum for developments in China. With Chinese 
producers gaining prominence abroad, their clout also grew at home. In 2006, Suntech re-
ceived the high profile contract for supplying modules for a rooftop installation on Bei-
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jing’s Olympic Stadium32. In 2010, in the run up to the launch of China’s 12th Five Year 
Plan, the State Council proclaimed the solar PV industry as a “strategic emerging industry” 
for China (Ahrens, 2013, p. 5; Zhang & White, 2012, p. 3). Subsequently, the Plan, 
launched in early 2011, included a target for 5 GW of installed capacity by 2015. In addi-
tion, in 2009 Jiangsu province announced a target of 240 MW by 2011 (Wong, 2009).  
4.2.2 Market formation 
The dynamics of domestic market formation in China largely mirrored the growing legiti-
macy of the industry. Market growth before 2010 was minimal relative to the rapidly ex-
panding markets in Europe. At the end of 2009, cumulative installed capacity stood at only 
300 MW (Honghua et al., 2012, p.7). From 2004, all major producers, therefore, generated 
the vast majority of their sales overseas, most importantly in Germany. Canadian Solar, 
Yingli and Trina all sold over 60 percent of their modules in Germany between 2004 and 
2006, while Suntech went from over 70 percent in 2004 to an average of 46 percent for the 
period33. While Germany remained the single largest market for these four companies 
through 2011, starting in 2006 the Spanish and from 2009 the Italian and Czech markets 
became other important destinations for Chinese module exports. In fact, at its peak in 
2008, the Spanish market represented the largest single destination of Chinese solar prod-
ucts (Kirkegaard et al., 2010, p.54).  
The following year, as the Spanish market imploded, the Chinese government commitment 
to developing a domestic market increased markedly. At the central level, the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development initiated a national subsidy program for building-
integrated PV (BIPV), while the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Re-
form Commission (NDRC) launched the Golden Sun Program. Both programs were based on 
a capital-subsidy scheme, offering subsidies of RMB 15 to RMB 20 per Watt and between 50 
to 70 percent of investment costs, respectively. By mid-2010, the government had ap-
proved 640MW of projects under the Golden Sun program, amounting to approximately 
RMB 20 billion in subsidies. In parallel, using feed-in tariff-type scheme, a first large-scale 
project was awarded by the National Energy Administration based on a competitive bidding 
process (Martinot, 2010, p.290). Based on the same scheme, a further 280 MW were auc-
tioned in 2010 (Huo & Zhang, 2012, p.41) (see overview of Chinese market growth and de-
mand-side policies in Figure 9). 
Moreover, at the provincial level, the governments of Jiangsu and Zheijang provinces, 
where an important share of the Chinese solar PV industry is based, initiated the country’s 
first feed-in tariff schemes for solar PV in 2009. In Jiangsu, a feed-in tariff was introduced 
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 Suntech Power Holdings, “Suntech Power Chosen to Provide Solar Energy System for Beijing Olympics”, April 
17, 2006. Accessed on September 11, 2013 at: http://ir.suntech-
power.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=192654&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=843121&highlight=  
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 Based company annual reports. 
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for different types of PV applications ranging from RMB 2.10 to RMB 4.30 per kWh, while 
the Zheijang government offered a premium of RMB 0.70 for electricity generated from PV 
systems over the average price of coal-based power (Martinot, 2010, p. 290). The govern-
ments in Shandong and Qinhai followed suit, launching feed-in tariff schemes in 2010 and 
2011, respectively (Green Prospects Asia, 2011; Viljoen, 2010).  
As a result of these measures, the Chinese market grew by over 200 percent in 2010 and 
500 percent in 2011, adding 0,5 GW and 2,5 GW of new capacity, respectively. With this 
China still lagged far behind the record numbers achieved in Germany with over 7 GW in 
both years as well as the explosive growth recorded in Italy, which recorded a total of 
more than 10 GW in 2010 and 2011. Nonetheless, this allowed China to increase its in-
stalled capacity from 8th (2009) to 7th (2010) and finally to the 4th largest globally in 2011 
(IEA-PVPS, 2012).  
Figure 9: Chinese market growth and key demand-side policies 
 
Source: Huo & Zhang (2012, p. 42) 
4.2.3 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
From 2004, China’s solar PV industry saw a surge of new entrants, while the pioneer firms 
invested aggressively in the rapid increase of their production capacity. As pointed out by 
Zhang & White (2012), the focus of activities shifted from exploration of new possibilities 
and the development of organizational legitimacy to the exploitation of demonstrated op-
portunities in the market. Among the pioneers, Trina, Yingli and Canadian Solar pursued 
strategies focused on vertical integration coupled with rapid expansion of productive ca-
pacity. Beginning with module production before or by 2004, they expanded their manu-
facturing activities progressively upstream thereafter, moving to the production of cells, 
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wafers, ingots, and, in the case of Yingli, even the production of purified silicon. Suntech, 
on the other hand, expanded its capacity for the production of cells and modules even 
more rapidly, but refrained from moving up the value chain34. As a result, it was able to 
establish itself as the largest manufacturer of solar cells by 2010 (REN21, 2011, p. 41).  
In parallel to the investments of the pioneers, a large number of new companies entered 
the industry at different points of the value chain and with different levels of investments. 
Among the major ventures, three waves of entries can be identified, each characterized by 
an increasing capital intensity and initial investment volume. The first approach largely 
mimicked Suntech’s model with its focus on the production of modules and cells for export 
to Germany and other European countries. The only representative of this approach in the 
list of the top-ten, foreign-listed firms was Solarfun, founded in 2004. Immediately follow-
ing this, JA Solar and Sunergy entered the sector with a larger initial investment and a fo-
cus, at least initially, on the production of solar cells. These were intended for processing 
mainly by domestic module producers. In 2005 and 2006, a third group, consisting of 
ReneSola, Jinko and LDK Solar, began with the production of silicon wafers, also mainly in-
tended for processing by domestic manufacturers. Especially the third group of companies 
followed up with ambitious vertical integration strategies. ReneSola and LDK Solar invested 
heavily in their core activity of wafer manufacturing, while integrating upstream and 
downstream with investments in the production of polysilicon, cells and modules. Jinko 
pursued a strategy of downstream integration, investing in a balanced set of wafer, cell 
and module production capacity. JA Solar and Sunergy, from the previous wave, initially 
maintained their focus on cell production. Only in 2010, did they add module production, 
mainly in an effort to boost their direct presence in foreign markets. Like Solarfun, they 
did not invest substantial resources in upstream segments of the supply chain, however35.  
These vertical integration strategies were enabled in part by the parallel emergence of a 
large number of second- and third tier manufacturing companies36, a number of which 
were acquired by the larger players. In addition, a growing network of suppliers to the PV 
industry began to develop during this period. These included a growing number of increas-
ingly specialized equipment suppliers as well as a number of established companies, such 
as GCL-Poly, which invested significant resources in the development of polysilicon produc-
tion. Finally, with the initiation of the bidding process for large scale solar energy installa-
tions, a range of State-owned enterprises entered the sector as project developers. In a 
number of instances, they partnered with the country’s large manufacturing firms, supply-
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 Based on company annual reports. 
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 In 2011, it was estimated that there were more than 330 Chinese module producers and more than 60 cell 
and wafer producers (Honghua et al., 2012). 
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ing needed project financing. In 2010, State-owned firms won 70 percent of the bids 
launched by the National Energy Administration (Schwartz, 2010).  
4.2.4 Resource mobilization 
The key focus of this system function during the period 2004 to 2010 was the mobilization 
of financial resources to enable a rapid scaling-up of manufacturing capacity. This process 
went hand in hand with a transition from the mobilization of domestic finance to strategies 
targeting international capital markets, culminating in the launching of initial public offer-
ings in New York and London. Suntech began this wave of solar IPOs in 2005, raising $400 
million for the company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Approximately one year 
later, the pioneers Trina and Canadian Solar as well as early followers, Solarfun and 
ReneSola, followed with IPOs on NYSE, NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange. The pro-
cess continued in 2007 with Yingli, LDK Solar, JA Solar and Sunergy and came to a close 
with ReneSola’s second IPO in 2008 and Jinko’s IPO in 2010. The proceeds ranged from a 
modest $50 million raised at ReneSola’s first IPO in London to a record $469 million raised 
by LDK Solar on NYSE (Zhang & White, 2012, p. 52-53) (see Table 2 and Table 3 for an 
overview). The total revenues from these eleven IPOs represented over $2 billion in public 
equity, amounting to more than half of total investment in 2005, 2007 and 2008 and close 
to 50 percent in the years 2006 and 200937.  
In the run up to these IPOs, the companies raised debt and equity from both foreign and 
domestic sources. Bank borrowing was mainly domestic and involved China’s “big four” 
State-owned commercial banks as well as a number of second tier commercial banks. In 
many cases, loans were guaranteed by local State-owned companies with stakes in the var-
ious companies. In Yingli’s case for example, the local state-owned company, Baoding 
Tianwei Baobian, which held a 51 percent stake during the years prior to the IPO, func-
tioned as an important facilitator for accessing bank lending. At this stage, the so-called 
policy banks, such as China Development Bank, played no major role in providing finance 
to the sector38.  
Simultaneously, private equity financing had evolved significantly. Initially, investments 
had come from the company founders and mainly local government-backed investment 
funds. In the run-up to the various IPOs, this was supplemented by important investments 
from a variety of international players. International investors ranged from smaller VC and 
equity funds, based mainly in Hong Kong and the US, to major international investment 
banks, like Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, HSBC and Goldman Sachs. The latter contributed a 
significant portion of the pre-IPO equity to Suntech, Canadian Solar and Yingli (Zhang & 
White, 2012, p. 52-53) (see overview of key funding sources and IPOs in Table 2).  
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Table 2: Main sources of funding of the four Chinese pioneer firms 
 Suntech Trina Canadian Solar Yingli 















Chinese and Hong 
Kong-based VC 
and private equi-
ty funds partly 




based VC and pri-






VC and private 
equity, Deutsche 
Bank, JP Morgan, 
various US in-
vestment banks 
Total of major 
pre-IPO equity 
funding 





of China and oth-
ers 
n.a. Industrial and 
Commercial Bank 
of China, China 
Everbright Bank, 
Royal Bank of 
Canada  
Agricultural Bank 
of China, Chinese 
Construction 
Bank, Bank of 
China, China 
Everbright Bank, 
China CITIC Bank 
Pre—IPO short-
term borrowings 





$13 million $25 million $1 million $72 million* 
Year and loca-
tion of IPO 
2005 / NYSE 2006 / NYSE 2006 / NASDAQ 2007 / NYSE 
IPO revenue $400 million $98 million $115 million $391 million 
Source: Zhang & White (2012, p. 52-53) and company annual reports. 
Table 3: IPOs of major post-2004 entrants 
 ReneSola Solarfun LDK Solar JA Solar Sunergy Jinko 
Year and 
location 
of IPO   
2006 / LSE 
2008 / NYSE 
2006 / 
NASDAQ 









$150 million $469 million $225 million $94 million $100 million 
Source: Zhang & White (2012, p. 52-53)  
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Complementing these commercial sources of finance, Chinese firms could also rely on a 
number of subsidy and investment support schemes. These subsidies are primarily offered 
by local and provincial governments in an effort to promote high-technology industrial 
firms. They are embedded in the broader Chinese paradigm of economic development and 
innovation, based on fierce regional competition (Gu & Lundvall, 2006; Xu, 2011). While 
the central government offers broad targets and guidelines, it delegates risk-taking and 
experimentation to lower levels of government. Within this framework, local governments 
have been characterized as “entrepreneurial” or “developmental” working with promising 
entrepreneurs and investors directly or indirectly to promote successful ventures within 
their jurisdiction39 (Baum & Shevchenko, 1999; Blecher & Shue, 2001).  
Table 4: Examples of investment support measures offered to PV sector by local govern-
ments 
 
Source: Grau et al. (2012, p.32)  
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In this effort to attract investment and promote entrepreneurship, local governments not 
only help arrange financing but typically also offer companies - whether foreign or locally-
owned - access to low-cost energy and land, tax breaks as well as different forms of in-
vestment grants (Haley & Haley, 2013a). Initially, these were available as generic subsidies 
for high-technology firms, but from a 2009 a number of provinces began to introduce 
schemes aimed specifically at the PV-sector (Grau et al., 2012). Table 4 provides an over-
view of the incentives offered by Huaian in Jiangsu province in 2009. In addition to these 
local-level benefits, officially recognized high-technology firms and foreign-invested en-
terprises are also entitled to a number of reductions in central government taxes. Newly 
established high-technology firms receive a 2-year tax holiday followed by 3 years of taxa-
tion at 12,5 percent. Thereafter, high-technology firms are taxed at the preferential rate 
of 15 percent40. Finally, foreign invested companies and R&D institutions may receive ex-
emptions from import or value-added taxes when purchasing specialized instruments and 
equipment (Huo & Zhang, 2012, p. 42-43). 
Most of the major solar energy firms note the receipt of investment or R&D grants in their 
annual reports starting in 2005 or 2006. Up to the year 2007, the recorded annual subsidies 
ranged – with the exception of LDK Solar - from under $100,000 to slightly over $2 million. 
From 2008 to 2009, the spread had widened significantly. While a number of companies 
reported no subsidies or subsidy levels of under €200,000, the majority of companies re-
ceived annual subsidies of several million dollars. By 2010, a number of companies had 
reached over $10 million in government grants and subsidies. Particularly high levels of 
subsidies are outlined in the annual reports filed by LDK Solar, which offers a detailed 
breakdown of the various sources. As early as 2007, LDK Solar received over $3 million in 
investment support and more than €3 million in electricity subsidies. Thereafter, electrici-
ty subsidies grew in tandem with production volumes and reached $33 million or approxi-
mately 20 percent of the company’s total electricity costs in 2010. Investment grants 
peaked in 2009 at $26 million. Finally, the company was exempted from a number of pay-
ments for acquired land use rights41 (see overview of subsidies received by LDK Solar in Ta-
ble 5).  
Table 5: Overview of subsidies received by LDK Solar (in million $) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Electricity subsidies 0,8 3,1 4,7 4,8 33,3 
Investment or R&D grants 1,5 3,6 1,9 31,5 5,6 
Subsidies on  land use rights     0,8 1,3 
Source: LDK Solar annual reports 
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 This reflects the tax policy as amended in 2008 (Deloitte, 2013). In previous years, similar 2+3 arrangements 
were in force. 
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 Based on company annual reports.  
FFU-Report 06-2013: Co-evolution in the Solar Energy Sector 41 
 
 
Starting in 2008, these investment support measures were complemented by the provision 
of major loan facilities by the China Development Bank. According to an agreement an-
nounced on December 23rd, 2008, the China Development Bank would provide loans of up 
to $70 million for the expansion of the Yingli’s cell manufacturing capacity by 100 MW42. 
More substantial support was offered from 2010 with multi-billion dollar loan agreements 
extended to LDK Solar ($8.9 billion), Suntech ($7.3 billion), Yingli ($5.9 billion) Trina and 
JA Solar ($4.4 billion each) (see overview of loans and credit agreements from State-owned 
banks to Chinese solar firms in Table 6). Due to their relatively high interest rates, these 
credit lines are frequently not drawn down by the firms. However, they function as de fac-
to repayment guarantees for commercial lenders (Sanderson & Forsythe, 2013). As a result, 
Chinese firms were largely unaffected by the global financial crisis and could even increase 
their borrowing during the height of the crisis.  
Table 6: Loans and credit agreements involving Chinese banks to Chinese solar companies 
since January 2010 
 
Source: Mercom Capital Group
43
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 Yingli Green Energy, “Yingli Green Energy Subsidiary Signs Eight-Year US$70 million Loan Agreement with 
China Development Bank to Support Expansion Plan”, December 23, 2008. Accessed on September 11, 2013 
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Finally, parallel to these large-scale investment activities, an important wave of smaller 
scale, private investments in the industry was taking place. Investments targeted smaller 
scale module production and the supply of components for the PV industry. While such 
SMEs are likely to have access to investment incentives offered by local high-technology 
industrial parks, they do not enjoy easy access to government-backed VC funding or bank 
financing. Rather Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises operate in a severely fi-
nance-constrained environment where investments by individuals and other informal fi-
nancing mechanisms represent the bulk of early stage financing (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; 
Huang, 2006; Xiao, 2011). 
4.2.5 Development of scale economies and cost reduction 
As mentioned above, in China system prices did not come down to the levels of Germany 
by 2010, presumably due to the relatively small market, the availability of capital subsi-
dies and the lack of competition at the local level. Modules, however, have been priced 
significantly below those produced in Europe (see Table 6). From 2007, spot market prices 
for Chinese modules have been €0,30 to €0,45 lower than for European modules (see Fig-
ure 10).  
Figure 10: Spot market prices for modules from Germany, Japan and China 
 
Source: Fawer & Magyar (2011, p. 10) 
There is a considerable degree of dispute regarding the question of how Chinese firms have 
been able to sustain this price difference. While no final conclusion can be drawn here, a 
number of contributing factors may be cited. Firstly, Chinese firms have focused almost 
exclusively on the low-cost production of silicon-based solar modules and have exploited 
China’s enabling environment for low-cost manufacturing. According to annual reports of 
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major Chinese manufacturers, semi-automated production processes and the increasing 
availability of domestically-produced low-cost equipment and components have helped re-
duce costs in China compared to other countries. According to media reports, Suntech was 
producing modules at a cost of $2,80 per W as early as 2003 (Powell, 2009). Secondly, not 
all Chinese manufacturers, in particular those entering the sector at a later date, had se-
cured long-term supply agreements for large volumes of polysilicon. As a result, they could 
take better advantage of falling spot market prices. Given the large additional investments 
in production capacity in 2009 and 2010, it is likely that an important share of total pro-
duction has been able to benefit from these lower raw material prices.  
Additionally, Haley & Haley (2013a, 2013b) and others have argued that investment sup-
port measures and subsidies and with access to abundant financial resources have provided 
Chinese manufacturing firms with an (unfair) cost advantage in relation to their European 
counterparts. Whether or not subsidy levels are truly above those in Europe or the US is 
difficult to establish, given the fundamentally different role of State actors in economic 
and financial sector governance in China and the West44. What is clear, however, is that 
governance of China’s PV sector enabled further expansion of productive capacity after 
2008, despite clear signals that further investments would most likely exacerbate already 
existing over-supply in the sector. This “irrational exuberance”, fuelled in no large part by 
equity from international investors, was further stimulated by the central government’s 
announcement in 2009 that it would support the PV industry within its strategy to support 
“strategic emerging industries”. 
The result was a further doubling of production capacity in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 3) 
and the emergence of 7 or 8 companies with a production capacity of more than 1 GW. The 
largest producers, Suntech and JA Solar, even reached close to 2 GW of production capaci-
ty (Jäger-Waldau, 2011 p. 26-32). This provided these firms and the Chinese industry as a 
whole with important scale economies. Goodrich, James, & Woodhouse (2011) have esti-
mated that the combination of internal and external economies of scale translate into a 
cost advantage for Chinese producers of approximately $0,12 per Wp (see Figure 11). More 
importantly, it created an unprecedented over-supply and a market environment driven by 
aggressive pricing strategies aimed at increasing market share. The result has been a dra-
matic reduction in module prices since 2009 (Jäger-Waldau, 2012; Mints, 2012; Willeke & 
Räuber, 2012). 
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Figure 11: Estimates of core manufacturing costs of silicon-based PV cells 
 
Source: Goodrich, James, & Woodhouse (2011) 
4.2.6 Knowledge development and diffusion 
Until 2010, knowledge development in the Chinese solar energy sector still lagged signifi-
cantly behind the activities in the leading countries of Germany, Japan or the US. The 11th 
Five Year Plan for Science and Technology did not place an important emphasis on support-
ing research in the PV sector, labeling it as low priority compared to wind or biomass-
related energy technologies. Nevertheless, R&D funding increased to approximately $30 
million45 for the period 2006 to 2010 (Huo & Zhang, 2012). R&D in the field of silicon pro-
duction was considered the highest priority. Among other things, a strategic cooperation 
with a Russian research institute had the purpose of narrowing the significant technology 
gap between Chinese and Western silicon producers (Fischer, 2012, p. 138). A result of 
these efforts, China’s share of international patents in this particular area shot up to 37 
percent in 2006/2007, more than any other country (see Figure 12). In other segments of 
the supply chain patenting activities also increased, but have remained significantly behind 
world leaders Germany and the US.  Similarly, in 2008, R&D intensity among the top Chi-
nese firms remained well below 1 percent of annual turnover and thus below global lead-
ers, like Schott, Q-Cells or Solar World (de la Tour et al., 2011, p. 766). More recently, 
however, a number of Chinese firms have begun to close the gap in R&D spending as fig-
ures for 2009 and 2010 reveal (see Table 7 in the annex). 
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Figure 12: Percentage of world patented innovation by segment and country in 2006–2007 
 
Source: de la Tour et al. (2011, p. 766) 
At the firm-level, knowledge development up to approximately 2007 remained mainly focused 
on acquiring existing know-how to launch state-of-the-art production lines. This had both a 
domestic and an important international dimension. Figure 13 below provides a stylized depic-
tion of the key actors and processes of knowledge diffusion. It highlights four central interna-
tional linkages through which knowledge was transferred to Chinese firms. The most im-
portant of these linkages remained the commercial relationships between German and other 
international equipment producers, on the one hand, and Chinese manufacturing firms, on the 
other. With a world market share of over 50 percent, German equipment producers supplied 
the majority of foreign machinery to Chinese firms (Wessendorf, 2012). Moreover, the sale of 
equipment was typically accompanied by consulting services for commissioning. This enabled 
Chinese firms to equip their production lines with cutting-edge technology as they rapidly 
built up their capacity. From 2006, so-called turnkey production lines from firms like Cen-
trotherm and Schmid Group46 appeared on the market, further lowering the barrier to enter 
the PV sector. Such turnkey lines were mainly supplied to 2nd or 3rd tier producers without 
the in-house expertise available at the larger firms47. 
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Figure 13: International and domestic processes of knowledge diffusion 
 
International knowledge transfer mechanisms 
1. Human resources transfer, R&D cooperation, licensing agreements; 2. Equipment purchase, consult-
ing services and human resources transfer; 3. Coaching; 4. Purchase of (turnkey) equipment and con-
sulting services; 5. Human resources transfer 
Domestic knowledge transfer mechanisms 
A. Human resources transfer; B. Cooperation via OEM agreements and cross-licensing; C. Mutual learn-
ing via equipment purchase and installation; D. Equipment purchase and installation 
 
Further linkages emerged between leading manufacturing firms from Germany and a num-
ber of earlier entrants among the Chinese firms, including Suntech, Trina and SolarFun. 
These relationships might be characterized as pre-commercial. To meet the burgeoning 
demand in Germany, a number of manufacturers had explored the possibility of establish-
ing OEM agreements and joint ventures with Chinese manufactures. In this context, they 
provided support to enable these firms to meet international quality standards48. Such di-
rect exchanges were complemented by indirect linkages between Chinese and US firms via 
the transfer of human resources. A large number of Chinese-born professionals with expe-
rience, in particular in the American solar energy industry, returned to China to take key 
positions in the emerging Chinese industry (de la Tour et al., 2011, p. 765). This was not 
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limited to manufacturing firms but also included equipment providers. For example, LDK 
Solar recruited an entire research team from the US-based equipment supplier GT Solar49.  
Last but not least, a key linkage was established between leading Chinese firms and inter-
national research institutes, most importantly the School of Photovoltaic and Renewable 
Engineering at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. Not only Suntech’s Dr. Shi, 
who obtained his PhD from the school, had close ties to the institute (Davila et al., 2009). 
Also a number of other PV firms were founded by or recruited Chinese graduates from 
UNSW, including CTOs and key R&D personnel at Yingli, Sunergy, SolarFun and JA Solar 
(Zhang & White, 2012). As the industry matured, these close ties became a central ele-
ment of the emergent firm-based R&D strategies. A number of companies developed part-
nerships with the UNSW aimed at adapting and integrating the university’s cutting-edge re-
search into their production lines. These ranged from licensing agreements to broader 
knowledge partnerships, such as the collaborative agreement between UNSW, Sunergy and 
the JaiNing Development Zone in Nanjing50. In some cases, patents, which had been devel-
oped decades earlier were finally commercialized via these partnerships (Bullis, 2011). 
From approximately 2008, similar forms of cooperation began to emerge with other im-
portant international research centers. Notably the energy research center ECN in the 
Netherlands entered in cooperation agreements with a number of Chinese manufacturers, 
including Yingli, Canadian Solar and JA Solar51. In partnership with Dutch equipment pro-
ducer Eurotron, ECN has been able to introduce its newest production techniques and cell 
concepts into the Chinese industry52.  
While these international linkages enabled Chinese firms to appropriate and develop cut-
ting-edge knowledge from around the world, the transfer of human resources from China’s 
pioneers to the early followers facilitated the transfer of key domestic knowledge. Addi-
tionally, domestic knowledge resources from the semiconductor industry and electronics 
manufacturing have contributed to the absorptive capacity of the young Chinese solar in-
dustry. Both researchers and industry professionals from these sectors have assumed key 
positions in many of the newly founded PV companies (Zhang & White, 2012). Moreover, a 
number of research centers have developed out of departments focused on semiconductors 
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and material science research. For instance, researchers from the School of Material Sci-
ences at Nanchang University founded the School of Photovoltaic Engineering in 2008, 
drawing on support from UNSW53. Finally, with the proliferation of 2nd and 3rd tier firms 
and a growing number of domestic component suppliers regional industrial clusters have 
developed in Jiangsu, Zheijang, Hebei, Jiangxi, Henan and Inner Mongolia (MIIT, 2012, 
p.4). Exchange of skilled personnel, supply relationships and cooperation in the form of 
OEM agreements are likely to have facilitated additional knowledge diffusion within the 
Chinese solar industry.  
4.2.7 Influence on the direction of search 
In the initial phase of industry development, activities in China were predominantly guided 
by developments in Germany and other markets, which developed in Spain, Italy and other 
European countries. To a lesser degree, prospects of capturing market share in the US also 
drove developments. The key goal was to reach European and US quality standards and at-
tain corresponding certifications54. The importance of reaching a consistently high product 
quality was further reinforced by conditions imposed by certain investors engaged in the 
financing of medium-to large-scale solar parks. To ensure the expected return on invest-
ment, panels for use in large-scale European installations were individually checked by in-
dependent auditors55. Efforts to secure the needed quality for market entry was comple-
mented by activities aimed at attaining cost leadership and at increasing market share via 
increased volumes of production and aggressive pricing strategies (Mints, 2012).  
Like in Germany and elsewhere, a key driver of R&D efforts was the high-price of polysili-
con, stimulating research aimed at reducing material inputs and developing the ability to 
utilize lower grade silicon56. This was complemented by a strategic focus of public R&D ef-
forts in developing the technological capabilities for producing low-cost silicon in China (de 
la Tour et al., 2011; Fischer, 2012). Overall, however, the low levels of public R&D spend-
ing in China suggest that domestic R&D policy played only a minor role in influencing activ-
ities among Chinese firms. Instead ties with international research institutes provided firms 
with the needed orientation for developing R&D programs.  
4.2.8 Development of positive externalities 
The investment boom from 2004 to 2010 enabled a wide-range of positive externalities to 
take shape, offering significant benefits to later entrants. As a first step, the increasing in-
vestment in production facilities motivated European equipment suppliers to target the 
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Chinese market and develop offices and services targeting the needs of Chinese customers. 
Conversely, pioneers like Yingli, Suntech and CSI established Chinese solar modules with 
international credibility, facilitating easier access to the German and other European mar-
kets for later entrants. Next, as the number and size of production facilities increased, 
markets for suppliers and equipment producers emerged locally, enabling manufacturers to 
procure low-cost equipment (Honghua et al., 2012, p. 3)57. Manufacturers and suppliers 
have concentrated in clusters around a number of lead firms. The largest cluster is located 
in the neighboring provinces of Jiangsu and Zheijang (Suntech, CSI, GCL, JA Solar, Solar-
fun, ReneSola, Sunergy, Trina, Hareon), while secondary clusters have emerged in Hebei 
(Yingli, JA Solar) and neighboring Inner Mongolia and Henan provinces as well as Jiangxi 
province (LDK Solar, Jinko).  
Next to the Marshallian externalities typically associated with industrial clusters, i.e. local 
knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling and the availability of specialist suppliers 
(Krugman, 1991; Marshall, 1920), the emergence of these clusters stimulated action first 
by local governments and eventually the central government. In other words, the success-
ful performance of the pioneer firms helped garner increasing support aimed specifically at 
strengthening the emergent cluster dynamics. 
5 Co-evolutionary dynamics: the role of transnational linkages and 
feedbacks 
As already alluded to throughout the analysis above, a number of system functions both in 
Germany and China were not supported locally but were supplied by actors and dynamics 
abroad. To enable this, an increasing number of transnational linkages, in particular be-
tween the Chinese and the German TIS, developed. These linkages in turn unleashed a se-
ries of mutually reinforcing inter-dependencies and feedbacks, which helped to accelerate 
developments in China, Germany and a number of third countries. The following section 
provides a characterization of the most important transnational linkages as well as the dy-
namic feedbacks they helped trigger.  
Given their unparalleled scale, the German-Chinese linkages may be considered the core 
drivers of growth and geographic reconfiguration of the TIS for solar PV during the period 
under consideration. In the following, they are, therefore, treated as exemplary for the 
broader dynamics of the TIS. Linkages with third countries are mentioned only if the par-
ticular type of relationship is not represented in the set of linkages between Germany and 
China and if they had important repercussions for developments in China or Germany.  
The linkages discussed in this section are divided into three categories, which serve as a 
basic analytical framework for the following section: 
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1. Commercial linkages: Commercial linkages are loosely equated to what Bell & Albu 
(1999) have called “transaction linkages” within a production system. According to 
Bell & Albu, “The production system can be understood to encompass the product 
designs, materials, machines, labor inputs, and transaction linkages involved in 
production of goods to a given specification.” (p. 1723). 
2. Knowledge linkages: The linkages across production systems are distinct from a 
second set of linkages, which help bridge the knowledge systems of China and Ger-
many and which are hence referred to as knowledge linkages. Again following Bell, 
“The knowledge system concept […] encompasses those flows of knowledge, stocks 
of knowledge and organizational systems involved in generating and managing 
changes in the products, processes or organization of production.” (p. 1793). While 
partly overlapping with the production system (Bell & Albu, 1999, p. 1793), it 
serves as a useful analytical device for distinguishing linkages directly related to 
the transfer of hardware, i.e. the exchange of productive inputs and finished prod-
ucts, from linkages supporting the transfer or development of knowledge. 
3. Financial linkages: A third set of transnational linkages, particularly important in 
the development of China’s PV industry, relates to interconnections within the 
realm of the international system of finance. While also inter-related with the pro-
duction system, these financial linkages involve a distinct set of actors and process-
es and are, therefore, treated separately. Notably, this is one key area where link-
ages between Germany and China did not play a central role in TIS development.  
5.1 Emerging transnational linkages from 1999 to 2003 
In the early phase of Chinese industry development to 2003, linkages between Germany 
and China remained relatively limited. The only foreign-invested ventures in China’s solar 
industry were Japanese and Canadian. Nevertheless, first commercial linkages had 
emerged. While equipment was primarily sourced from the US in the 80s and 90s, Chinese 
companies began to source equipment from Germany and other European countries to-
wards the turn of the century (Marigo, 2007, p. 146). Japanese equipment imports were 
less important, since Japanese manufacturers have been less reliant on the external pro-
curement of equipment and have limited exports of their in-house equipment to protect 
their technologies from competitors (Marukawa, 2012, p. 13).  
Simultaneously, the first Chinese modules were being shipped to Germany. In 2002, Chi-
nese exports of solar cells and modules to Germany stood at US$11,8 million (Kirkegaard et 
al., 2010, p. 54). The relationship between Germany at this stage should not be character-
ized as unique or especially intense when compared to other leading countries, i.e. the US 
or Japan, however. Exports to Japan and the US had a similar volume. Overall shipments of 
solar products from China to the rest of the world represented less than 1 percent of glob-
al shipments in 2003 (Mints, 2012, p. 62). In addition, China’s rural electrification pro-
grams were co-financed by international donors and, like Germany’s 100,000 rooftop pro-
gram, were partly supplied by established foreign module producers. 
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As mentioned above, an important knowledge relationship for the development of the Chi-
nese TIS was the link between Suntech’s Dr. Shi and the UNSW in Australia. The location of 
a world-class solar energy research institute in a country, which is not only relatively close 
to China geographically but which had not developed a significant solar PV sector of its 
own, made this collaboration particularly promising for both sides. As will be argued in the 
following section, this international knowledge partnership evolved into one of the crucial 
factors in enabling the rapid development of the Chinese industry after 2003. In Germany, 
international knowledge partnerships played a less significant role, given the substantial 
domestic stock of knowledge that firms could draw on. Nevertheless, a number of new 
ventures also engaged in exchanges with producers in the US to acquire important know-
how.  For instance, Solar World cooperated with US-based GT Equipment Technologies to 
establish its first in-house facility for the production of solar-grade silicon58.   
5.2 Transnational linkages from 2004 
5.2.1 Core commercial linkages between Germany and China 
As the TIS entered its growth phase in 2004, the core commercial linkages between China 
and Germany started developing rapidly. Firstly, Chinese manufacturing firms imported in-
creasing volumes of German-made equipment for establishing and expanding their produc-
tion lines in China. As indicated in the graph below, German equipment exports to Asia had 
already surpassed domestic sales by 2007, representing between one third and one half of 
total sales. With annual world market shares of 30 to 50 percent (see Figure 14), German 
equipment suppliers have thus played a central role in enabling the development of the 
Chinese TIS. Not only did equipment suppliers deliver the needed machinery, but they also 
supplied important consulting services to make use of this equipment.  
The depth of German engagement in enabling China’s industrial development is further 
underlined by the dominance of German suppliers of turnkey equipment. In 2009, five of 
the six largest producers of turnkey equipment for silicon-based PV wafers, cells and mod-
ules were German (Heup & Rentzing, 2009, p.60). With an even larger share of Asian sales 
than overall, German-made turnkey production lines have represented a key vehicle for 
second or third tier producers to enter the sector. Since contracts for the delivery of turn-
key equipment typically included warranties for the performance of machinery, suppliers 
were obliged to help manufacturers with commissioning59.  
Simultaneously, equipment sales to China and other Asian countries have enabled German 
equipment producers to generate the needed revenue to reduce equipment costs and in-
vest in industrial-scale production of specialized components. In other words, Asian in-
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vestments have represented a key to the development of economies of scale within the 
German equipment sector. Moreover, they helped German equipment suppliers in making 
some of the highest R&D expenditures in the industry, both in absolute terms and by share 
of revenue (see Table 7 in the annex), thus helping to drive further improvements in 
equipment and processes.  
Figure 14: Sales of German equipment manufacturers by region 
 
Source: VDMA 2012 
The second key linkage directly followed from the rapid entry of Chinese firms in the PV 
sector. With the support of German equipment producers, Chinese manufacturing firms 
rapidly increased their exports of modules, cells and wafers to Germany and other Europe-
an countries. The share of Germany’s PV-related imports from China grew from 19 percent 
in 2005 to almost 50 percent in 2010 (Kirkegaard et al., 2010, p.54). Underlying this export 
success were a number of commercial relationships with German firms as well as certifica-
tion bodies. In the beginning stages, Chinese module producers established relationships 
with project developers as well as German manufacturing firms, for which they provided 
OEM services. Only after having established the credibility of Chinese modules in the Ger-
man market and having acquired certifications from TÜV and VDE did Chinese manufactur-
ers pursue strategies targeting the residential market via distributors. In addition, as spe-
cialized cell and wafer producers from China started entering the market from approxi-
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mately 2006, supply contracts with German module or cell producers became a third im-
portant supply chain linkage60.  
It may also be noted here that mergers and acquisitions did not play a significant role in 
developing international linkages between Chinese and foreign firms. Notable exceptions 
are Suntech’s acquisition of the German firms Kuttler Automation Systems and CSG Solar 
and Japanese module manufacturer MSK Corporation as well as LDK Solar’s acquisition of 
SPI, a US-based project development firm. 
5.2.2 Knowledge linkages 
While the Chinese-German commercial linkages represented the core drivers of TIS dynam-
ics, the knowledge linkages discussed in the following section might be considered im-
portant enabling factors. Three partly inter-related, transnational knowledge linkages sup-
ported the development and increasing competitiveness of the Chinese TIS. As described in 
section 4.2.6, one important linkage between China’s PV industry and leading sources of 
global knowledge was embodied in the increasing number of Chinese returnees (de la Tour 
et al., 2011). They brought international experience, mainly from US-based firms, as well 
as skills developed in foreign educational institutions to the Chinese PV sector. A key 
source of foreign graduates was the School of Photovoltaic and Renewable Engineering at 
the UNSW in Sydney, while returnees from Germany played no major role.  
Out of the strong personal ties between the Chinese PV industry and UNSW a number of 
formalized knowledge partnerships between UNSW and the Chinese PV industry developed. 
These included licensing agreements, R&D partnerships and broader cooperative agree-
ments. As the TIS developed, licensing agreements and R&D partnerships were also estab-
lished with other foreign research institutes, notably ECN in The Netherlands (see section 
4.2.6 above) . This did not, however, include partnerships with institutes in Germany. Giv-
en the large dependence on German government funding, a tacit agreement existed to re-
frain from activities aimed explicitly at transferring knowledge to industry in foreign coun-
tries61.  
Ironically, however, in the early stages of Chinese industry development, a number of 
large German manufacturers entertained ties with selected Chinese firms with the pro-
spect of entering into a joint venture at a later data. Although these joint ventures did not 
materialize, these firms provided their emergent competitors with important support in 
developing the capacity to produce solar modules with sufficient quality to meet interna-
tional standards.  
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5.2.3 Financial linkages 
Transnational financial linkages were another key enabler of TIS development and growth. 
As indicated in section 4.2.4, international investors supplied Chinese manufacturers in the 
form of VC, private equity and public equity. Important foreign VC and private equity 
funds were based in the US, Hong Kong, Singapore, the UK, Switzerland, Australia, Israel 
and Japan. Interestingly no major investment was made by a German fund. In addition, 
major capital injections came from international investment banks and their subsidiaries. 
Important investments were made by Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan 
Chase, HSBC as well as Deutsche Bank (Zhang & White, 2012, p. 52-53). Finally, with one 
exception, all IPOs were made via the New York-based stock market, i.e. NYSE and 
NASDAQ. ReneSola represents the exception with two successive IPOs, a first in London 
(LSE) and a second in New York (NYSE). The importance of public equity in driving Chinese 
industry growth was immense. According to BNEF data public equity accounted for more 
than half of total investment in 2005, 2007, 2008 and slightly under 50 percent in 2006 and 
2009, while government debt remained negligible at that stage. Only with the entry of the 
China Development Bank in 2010 did this change62.  
5.3 Key impacts and feedbacks  
As a result of these increasing cross-country linkages as well as the market and industry 
dynamics they triggered, developments in the solar energy sectors of China and Germany 
have also become increasingly inter-dependent. At the beginning of the period under con-
sideration, developments in the respective policy, market and industrial systems were still 
relatively unaffected by each other. With the growth of a large, export-oriented solar in-
dustry in China, largely dependent on sales to Germany, this changed drastically. As a con-
sequence, developments have become increasingly co-evolutionary, characterized by dis-
tinct country-level dynamics yet influenced by developments in the other country. In the 
following, the most important cross-country impacts and feedbacks are outlined.  
Firstly, Chinese exports to Germany may be considered both the cause and the effect of 
the rapid growth of Chinese PV industry. On the one hand, they supplied the revenue and 
the credibility – both domestically and in the international financial markets - to pursue 
large-scale investments in productive capacity. On the other hand, they represent the out-
come of increasing investment activities. Simultaneously, Chinese module production ena-
bled the exponential growth of the German PV market. As early as 2007, Chinese produc-
tive capacity had outstripped Germany’s. By 2008, Chinese capacity was almost 50 percent 
greater, and by 2010 it had reached more than five times the level of Germany (Figure 3). 
These large investments in productive capacity became a key to the decline in module 
prices and the subsequent market acceleration in Germany. In the absence of these price 
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declines, profit margins for project developers and residential customers would not have 
permitted the large scale market growth witnessed in 2009 and 2010.  
In a second step, these market and industry dynamics had feedbacks at the policy level 
with important implications for the further development of the sector. The immediate re-
sult of industry growth and the resulting price reductions was the ability and necessity to 
reduce German feed-in tariffs without jeopardizing continued market development. In a 
revision of the Renewable Energy Act on passed on October 31, 2008, German policy mak-
ers increased the annual reductions of the solar feed-in tariff from 6.5 percent to between 
8 and 10 percent, depending on the type of installation. As these measures failed to curtail 
market growth, another revision of the law was initiated in early 2010, leading to a host of 
one-time FIT reductions as well as a scheme for a dynamic system of tariff reductions for 
subsequent years. Based on the growth recorded in the market, FIT reductions were to be 
adjusted to contain market growth within a fixed corridor. While the measures were large-
ly unsuccessful, they increased uncertainty in the market. This was further compounded by 
even more dramatic events in Spain. There the same underlying dynamics resulted in a 
spectacular overheating of the market in 2008 followed by the total collapse of the Spanish 
subsidy scheme in 2009.  
In a third step, these events in Germany and Spain were in turn mirrored by important pol-
icy changes in China initiated in 2009. Next to the launch of the Rooftop and Golden Sun 
programs, the government raised the solar PV target for 2011 to 2 GW. This was followed 
up in 2010 with the implementation of a bidding process for the allocation of feed-in tar-
iff-style subsidies for a total of 280 MW. Moreover, in an explicit effort to boost the sales 
of its renewable energy industry, the Chinese announced plans to launch a new energy 
stimulus plan, including a target of 20 GW for solar PV by 2020 (Martinot, 2010; SEMI & 
CPIA, 2011). While no single factor can explain this major shift towards developing a do-
mestic market for solar PV, the following impacts and subsequent feedbacks from the 
largely export-led development of China’s PV industry were clearly crucial: 
 The development of over-capacity, mainly in China, leads to a rapid decline of module 
prices, making solar energy both more affordable as an energy source and less lucrative 
for domestic manufacturers. 
 Resulting rapid market growth leads to policy responses in Germany as well as Spain, 
creating a rise in policy- and hence market uncertainty.  
 The Chinese government, faced with a large-scale manufacturing industry for photovol-
taic cells and modules, responds by launching policies to develop its own market for so-
lar energy, while elevating the sector to the status of a “strategic emerging industry”.  
6 Summary of findings and conclusions 
The above analysis has helped unpack the co-evolutionary process of TIS development in 
silicon-based solar PV technologies in the growth phase from 2004 to 2010 with a focus on 
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the key countries, China and Germany. In doing so, it has not only shed light on the im-
portant role of transnational linkages and feedbacks in overall TIS development. It has also 
provided an analysis of China’s rapid insertion in a global TIS, and its rise from its status as 
industry outsider to the position of the world’s leading production center. Conversely, it 
contains a number of lessons regarding the interplay between policy, market and industry 
in Germany, the policy-driven lead market during the period under consideration. The fol-
lowing section offers a synthesis of key empirical insights in these three areas and discuss-
es their theoretical and policy-related implications.  
6.1 Co-evolutionary dynamics 
As already highlighted in the previous section, this study has demonstrated the growing 
importance of transnational linkages between China and Germany for understanding the 
dynamics of TIS development in both countries. In a process of co-evolution, each country 
depended on developments in the other country to enable the rapid growth of the global 
solar energy sector that occurred between 2004 and 2010. Nevertheless, in many respects, 
each national-level TIS remained highly autonomous. Given the policy-driven nature of 
demand, domestic markets also remained dependent on national policy makers. Moreover, 
firms retained a clear national identity with no multinational players emerging who enter-
tained production facilities in both countries. As a result, industry dynamics and firm 
strategies were strongly shaped by the respective national innovation system and its under-
lying model of economic governance.  
In the resulting co-evolutionary dynamics of global TIS development, the mutual support of 
weak or missing system functions enabled an international process of cumulative causa-
tion, accelerating TIS development in both countries via a number of cross-country impacts 
and feedback loops. Of particular importance for this mutually reinforcing process are the 
exploitation of the asymmetries across country-level TIS by actors based in one country yet 
entertaining linkages to developments abroad. While the German feed-in tariff and the 
highly developed project-based financing mechanisms in Germany were key to large-scale 
market formation, China’s strongly production-oriented investment climate with a focus on 
established business models and technologies was an important enabler of the develop-
ment of scale economies and cost reduction.  
This depiction of TIS development revises the simplistic notion of a lead market, where an 
innovation reaches significant market penetration before diffusing to other lag markets 
(Beise, 2001, 2004). It gives rise to a more nuanced understanding of how country-level 
differences shape the development and geographic reconfiguration of emerging industries. 
In this case, China, a lag market in terms of demand, has played a key role in fuelling the 
expansion of supply to the emerging lead market and, via the feedbacks described above, 
has enabled the acceleration of market growth. Moreover, while China acquired important 
production equipment and expertise from Germany, it has also tapped into other interna-
tional knowledge resources to advance the technology frontier. Rather than merely absorb-
ing and adapting knowledge, China has become a producer of knowledge in its own right 
FFU-Report 06-2013: Co-evolution in the Solar Energy Sector 57 
 
 
(Bullis, 2011). In other words, as China has matured as a country-level TIS, it has not only 
fuelled the spectacular growth of the global industry but it has also begun to support inno-
vation within the emergent global TIS.  
6.2 The rise of China 
A second important contribution of the study has been to identify the key factors, which 
have contributed to the success of Chinese TIS development. It has shown the importance 
of the cooperation between entrepreneurs and local governments in combination with key 
transnational linkages, which helped support relatively weak or virtually non-existent sys-
tem functions, like resource mobilization, market formation or knowledge development. 
While the local governments provided entrepreneurs with support in accessing domestic 
capital and other key inputs, like land or low-cost energy, entrepreneurs remained in con-
trol of developing the strategic direction of their companies. Tapping into international 
market opportunities and resources, they took their main orientation from booming mar-
kets in Germany and other European countries, which helped them fuel their strongly 
growth-oriented strategies. This included the core import-export relationship with German 
equipment suppliers, on the one hand, and German manufacturers, system integrators and 
eventually distributors, on the other. This was complemented by the recruitment of for-
eign-trained Chinese and other international talent and knowledge partnerships with UNSW 
and other international research centers. Finally, the core source of funding to finance in-
dustry expansion came from international investors.  
The central government on the other hand played no active role in promoting industry ex-
pansion until 2009. By 2008, however, China had already reached close to 30 percent of 
global production capacity and dominated imports in the major markets of Spain and Ger-
many, accounting for a share of 51 and 37 percent, respectively63. In other words, it has 
been the broader Chinese innovation system and its model of economic governance, which 
provided suitable conditions for attracting the international investments, which fuelled the 
industry’s growth and ultimately over-supply. Many have pointed out the role of subsidies 
and access to abundant capital resources as the key explanatory factor for Chinese com-
petitive advantage. However, until the entry of China Development Bank in 2009, the 
abundance of capital resources was a decidedly international phenomenon.  
In an alternative perspective, the growth of China’s solar energy sector might be viewed as 
the outcome of an industrial development-oriented governance system, which places a 
high priority on channeling scarce financial resources into productive investments. Moreo-
ver, it represents a system where the mobilization of financial resources and the access to 
land remains inherently linked to State actors who remain key mediators in enabling en-
trepreneurs to access needed inputs. In this context, local governments act as entrepre-
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neurs and managers of local industrial growth, placing bets on the most promising ventures 
and supporting local champions. They engage in a process of firm selection followed by a 
period of collaboration and support to enable firm success.  
In the past, hi-tech enterprises, which have been selected and promoted in this way, have 
largely been State-owned enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises or joint ventures be-
tween the two (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2010; Tuan & Fung-Yee Ng, 2007; Whalley & Xin, 2010).The 
solar energy sector reflects a trend towards the increasing importance of privately owned 
Chinese firms with the ability to attract funding from the financial markets (i.e. foreign 
portfolio investment) (Deng, 2013). In this case control over productive investments re-
mained in the hands of Chinese entrepreneurs and their management teams. Moreover, un-
like FDI-driven ventures, transnational linkages and access to foreign knowledge resources 
were not inherent to the firms themselves. Instead Chinese entrepreneurs have been par-
ticularly successful in leveraging the synergies of China’s system of industry promotion, on 
the one hand, and international knowledge resources and production equipment, on the 
other.  
While this study provides key insights on how this success took shape in one prominent in-
dustrial sector, a key avenue for future research is the exploration of the industry-specific 
aspects, which explain this Chinese success story. Why has this been possible in the PV sec-
tor, while other sectors have been less successful? What industry-level characteristics or 
policies might explain these differing trajectories? 
6.3 Lead market dynamics in a policy-driven environment 
In the German media, China’s rise as global production center for solar cells and modules 
is frequently equated with the loss of Germany’s industrial leadership (Gratzla, 2011; 
Volkmann, 2013). This is only partially true. Portraying Germany’s cell and module manu-
facturing industry as the leaders of the PV industry is and was inaccurate. While Germany 
has represented the undisputed lead market from 2004 to the present, it has not held the 
same position in the supply of solar modules. While individual firms have recorded impres-
sive growth stories, Germany has never represented the largest production center for solar 
modules and cells. Until 2007, Japan remained the leading manufacturer, albeit closely 
followed by Germany. By 2008 China had taken over that role. Moreover, German firms 
were never able to meet domestic demand, so that more than half of the German market 
was always supplied by foreign suppliers. Given the high export ratios of German manufac-
turers, import quotas were consistently above 60 percent.  
As discussed above, this lag in supply represents an important factor in explaining the suc-
cessful market entry of Chinese firms in Germany. No attempt will be made here to specu-
late on what might have occurred in the absence of the supply shortages witnessed be-
tween 2005 and 2008. Rather it is taken as a symptom of the fact that Germany’s bold de-
mand-side policies lacked a complementary supply-side strategy. While Germany main-
tained a high level of R&D and even provided investment support, especially in the Eastern 
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part of the country, there was no strategy to address strategic bottlenecks, such as the sil-
icon shortage. Given the fairly broad anticipation of the shortage and the leading position 
of German silicon producer Wacker, addressing this was merely a question of financing. 
Hence it could theoretically have been addressed by a concerted industry effort, possibly 
with the support of government or a public financial institution.  
In addition, German firms were relatively late in exploiting the opportunities of low-cost 
manufacturing locations, including China. Given the rising importance of China, in particu-
lar in the area of clean energy technologies, this represents a second industry-wide miscal-
culation. While discussions to collaborate with leading Chinese manufacturers existed, 
these apparently did not yield the expected agreements. Given the ease with which tech-
nological capacities were developed by Chinese manufacturers, an earlier, more pro-active 
strategy to engage with the emerging Chinese firms would have been strategically im-
portant. It might have yielded a large, international firm under German leadership rather 
than vice versa.  
Mobilizing large volumes of long-term finance to support such a venture represents a third 
systemic bottleneck. While China Development Bank entered the sector in 2010 and helped 
China’s leading solar energy firms bridge the twin crises facing the sector (i.e. the global 
financial crisis and the mismatch between supply and demand), Germany’s firms could not 
depend on similar, long-term financing commitments. Given the significant volumes of fi-
nance already committed via feed-in tariffs, investment support and R&D subsidies as well 
as the long-term strategic importance of the sector, the lack of a corresponding source of 
strategic financing to support emerging industries represents a key weakness in the Ger-
man and European model of economic governance - in particular when considering the 
large volumes of public resources mobilized to support the European financial sector. It 
raises questions whether State support to the European financial sector has sufficiently 
taken into account the financing challenges currently constraining the development of 
leading European firms in emerging industries like solar photovoltaics.  
Finally, it should be noted that, in spite of these weaknesses, Germany has developed and 
still maintains a leadership position in the global production of inverters and equipment for 
the solar industry. In other words, China’s leadership position only applies to certain seg-
ments of the supply chain. Correspondingly, Germany has been able to leverage its lead 
market to promote leading industrial firms in selected segments of the supply chain. Un-
surprisingly, these firms have developed out of existing businesses in areas where Germany 
exhibits a traditional strength and are mostly located in Southern Germany. Manufacturers 
of modules and cells on the other hand developed primarily as greenfield investments in 
East Germany. Hence their initial position was not drastically different from that of Chi-
nese firms.  
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7 Annex 
Table 7: Correlation of PV industry sales growth rates and R&D investment growth rate for 
public listed PV companies for the years 2004 – 2009 
 
 
Source: Breyer et al. (2010) 
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